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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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**Defense Official on Payments for
Exercise-Related Environmental Damage**

18300772 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Aug 89 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Yu. Pikulev, chief, Moscow Military District Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature, by V. Shcherban: "'Waterloo' On a Field of Oats"]

[Text] Maneuvers in the countryside are feared like a heart patient fears an infarction. From experience it is known that as soon as the "north" beats the "south" and rolls back to their bases what remains on the battlefield is torn up roads, oil polluted streams, crops trampled down by equipment, to say nothing of land torn up by tank tracks and explosions. When the dust from the departing tanks settles, the "scandal time" and haggling with the army begins. To handle this the military has set up the so-called crop damage commission. Its goal is to quickly calculate damages, pay for them down to the last kopeck, solve all problems and depart in peace.

Troops from the Moscow Military District recently fought it out. Our correspondent met with Yu. Pikulev, chief of the District's Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature.

[V. Shcherban] Yuriy Konstantinovich, people do not know enough about the activities of the crop damage commission. It has always been in the shadows, nobody wrote about it. If they did, there would have been discussions about one of the most murky aspects of military exercises, about disputes and litigation between rural dwellers and the military, about swindling and mutual deceit. Therefore, they kept silent. These facts are in sharp contrast with the image of military exercises on television: orchestras, flowers, the invariable presentation of bread and salt, kisses and dances. In other words, an idyll. In short, we knew about one side of the coin, but what about the other?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] The public really does have misunderstandings about the conduct of army exercises. Tanks break down fences and dig up gardens and dirt roads. The larger the exercise the more disputes there are. Rural soviets and kolkhoz farmers naturally complain: Either repair what has been broken or pay for it. The crop damage commission (which includes the chief of the District Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature, a financial officer, lawyer and chief of the forestry department) is also obligated to examine all complaints and to prevent scandals. Thus, we are sort of a buffer organization. However, don't think that we are only justifying ourselves. Often we are accused of things of which we are not guilty. For example, it was reported that our truck drove through a corn field. It was determined on the spot that the tracks were not from our truck. Unfortunately, however, rightly or wrongly farmers want to get more out of us. We check out everything. If somebody complains that soldiers dug up a couple of buckets of potatoes from

a garden, what do we do? We reach a compromise and settle accounts with work or gasoline.

[V. Shcherban] Inhabitants of areas where there were exercises often write indignant letters: "Probably Napoleon did not leave such a disfigured landscape as do soldiers after exercises. It looks like after the Battle of Waterloo. As a member of the crop damage commission, what do you see after exercises by the Moscow Military District?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] I don't know about the situation in other military districts, but there were no special complaints about our's that time. The soldiers restored damaged land and repaired and washed everything broken or dirtied. As a result there was not a single complaint from the public. Overall, it should be noted that there has been a big change in the army's attitude towards ecological questions. Everything was different just 2 or 3 years ago. However, in 1987 inspectorates for the protection of nature were set up at all districts. They now monitor the observation of environmental laws by all military personnel. The commission I head has repeatedly shown its claws—we fined one unit 10,000 rubles, several officers were retired for polluting the environment. There are many such examples.

[V. Shcherban] What is your estimate of the cost of damage by Moscow Military District forces during the last exercise?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Around 1,500 rubles. This is mainly for destruction of trees. This is a tiny amount. Sometimes payments reach hundreds of thousands.

[V. Shcherban] I personally am doubtful about such a total. Is it conceivable that so many soldiers could move around in such a huge territory and only do 1,500 rubles worth of damage to grass and trees? Moreover, there were letters from the area of this recent maneuver that disagreed with the miserly compensation. They write that fruit trees were knocked down. How much do you pay somebody for an apple tree?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] For an apple tree up to 20 years old we pay 60-70 rubles and for each year over 20 we add 2 rubles.

[V. Shcherban] Now I understand the reason for the letter writers' dissatisfaction. After all, if, in the autumn, the owner of the tree sold its apples they would bring in at least 100 rubles. You only give him 60-70. This causes the dissatisfaction. What about nonmonetary values? How are they calculated? Why not pay the owner 10 times the value of the destroyed tree, as libraries do for lost books? Then, I am convinced, trees would not be destroyed.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] This complaint is not correctly addressed. The size of payments is not set by the Ministry of Defense, but by the price departments at obispolkoms. Every oblast has its price list for damages. Everything depends upon climate conditions, vegetation

and water resources. For example, in Moscow Oblast a cubic meter of water costs 4 kopecks, while in arid regions the price ranges from 11 to 16 kopecks. The further south the exercises the more expensive they are. However, I agree with you that these fines are only symbolic. They should be convincing.

[V. Shcherban] Local inhabitants often complain to soldiers that they do not look where they step. Tell us, prior to sending young soldiers out on exercises, do you give them an understanding of the need to protect nature?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course, during each training period soldiers are given 4 hours and officers 6 hours of lectures on this subject. In addition, we have a leaflet "On the Protection of Nature."

[V. Shcherban] I have seen that leaflet. It is a collection of banal phrases such as: "We should protect and beautify our land," "During field exercises you should avoid damaging the soil," "Do not allow..." "Be careful...", "Strictly observe..." and so on.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Do you think that soldiers first learn about ecology from this leaflet? We are only reminding them.

[V. Shcherban] There are often exercises in Western European countries. However, I have not heard about any misunderstandings between the population and the army after exercises.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] That is not surprising. In the FRG, for example, there are special ecological units that have equipment to repair damages: scrapers, bulldozers, and excavators. These units do their own plowing and harrowing. Consequently, the public has practically no complaints about the army. If the military does not clean up its mess, then the local administrative organs where the exercise took place forbid the next exercise. This is also true in Denmark and the Netherlands.

[V. Shcherban] How do farm managers react to the news that exercises will take place?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] In differing ways. After all, although we damage dirt roads, we also repair them so they are in excellent shape—grading and compacting them. We also give technical help to farms. In Belorussia, for example, we hauled hundreds of tons of flax for one farm. Who would refuse such help? Others receive this news unenthusiastically. Some ask that the troops be taken further away from their land.

[V. Shcherban] I think this is understandable. Leasing and cost accounting dictate their own rules. What is to be done if, long before the official announcement, army strategists have designated tree lines as hills and rivers as water barriers? Can a selsovet change anything if it is persistent and does not want to be host to the exercise?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] First of all, such decisions are coordinated with local soviets, right up to the USSR Council of

Ministers. Secondly, exercises are not often conducted on farm land. Mainly they are in training areas. Finally, what does it mean to be "persistent and not want?" Exercises are an important state undertaking. During them we try to get all services to work together, to sharpen troops' battle readiness in conditions as realistic as possible.

So far the public has not protested maneuvers before they take place. What will happen in the future I cannot say.

[V. Shcherban] Are exercise times coordinated with rural dwellers? Is this the dictate of the military?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Usually exercises take place prior to March or after September. Their times are adjusted. Long before they begin a reconnaissance group visits the proposed region and reaches agreement on all disputed points.

[V. Shcherban] Are these matters taken to court?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] One was, in April 1987. There was an emergency discharge of several tons of fuel oil. A large share of it was cleaned up, but some entered a river. We were given a bill for 400,000 rubles.

[V. Shcherban] Did you pay it?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course not. We did not think it was justifiable. Moreover, almost all the fuel was cleaned up. Only one-thirteenth was not taken out of the water. This was affirmed by specialists in our sanitation and epidemiological detachment. The rayon SES [Sanitation and Epidemiological Detachment] then turned to Gosarbitrazh [USSR State Board of Arbitration]. It agreed with us. We did pay for the damage we caused, but only a small part of the bill presented us.

[V. Shcherban] But doesn't an army sanitation and epidemiological detachment work according to the principle "Do what you please?"

[Yu. K. Pikulev] We always use their services to handle disputes. These detachments monitor air, water and soil quality. They have the equipment for this. However, there can be no talk about juggling the results. The rayon SES [Sanitation and Epidemiological Detachment] worked together with our specialists. Water and soil samples were taken from the same places. This research was done independently. Naturally, the results coincided.

[V. Shcherban] As I understood it, crop damage commissions are a working organ of inspectorates for the protection of nature. Their authority ceases when the last conflict is settled. What about the time when no exercises are under way? Can these inspectorates monitor ecological conditions in the armed forces? Incidentally, how many people are working in the inspectorate which you lead?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Hmm, at this time two people.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Everything is clear. And you think that such a "formidable" force can handle the tasks entrusted to it?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course you have a right to be ironical. However, one cannot deny that recently the officer corps has become remarkably "green", that is it is paying attention to ecological questions. I can give you dozens of examples where officers and soldiers have shown a careful attitude towards nature even during exercises. There are military units which have something to show any civilian organization with regard to this question. Of course, we are not able to put everything in order. This requires supplying the inspectorate with the instruments needed to monitor the air, water and soil. We also need to solve personnel questions. Special laboratories must be set up. It is time to combine civilian and military efforts. We should not ignore a single instance of damage to trees or pollution of reservoirs. These must be quickly reported to inspectorates for the protection of nature. Violators will be dealt with harshly as was done during the last exercises.

[V. Shcherban] Thank you, Yuriy Konstantinovich, for the frank discussion. One hopes that in its future exercises the army will respect farmers' labor. Also, your ranks contain many peasant youth, who, as is said, God himself taught to take care of the land on which they will work.

Lithuanian Presidium Resolution on Military Service

18011007 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
27 Aug 89 p 1

[Unattributed article entitled: "In the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR".]

[Excerpt] Recently, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR and, acting for it, the Commission on the Affairs of the Military Service of the Young People of the Republic has received more and more signals from those undergoing military service concerning unprevented nonregulation relations. This situation elicits a fundamental alarm on the part of the parents of soldiers and of society. The Presidium approved a draft resolution, prepared by the Commission, on the military service of citizens of the Lithuanian SSR, which will be presented to the session for discussion. The purpose of this document—is so that Republic young people will serve in military units, deployed on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, in the Baltic or Belorussian Military Districts, and in order that the Medical Commissions will intensify verification of the health of draftees and will select with particular precision and responsibility young people for military service.

'Accusation' by AWOL Latvian Soldiers Published

18011015 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by TASS correspondents V. Sebyakin and A. Danilin, special to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "About the Service in Two Dimensions: From the Standpoint of the NFL... and of the Law"]

[Text]

From the Standpoint of the NFL [National Front of Latvia]

The newspaper PADOMYU YAUNATNE (Soviet Youth) published in Riga in the Latvian language has published a letter of 11 Latvian soldiers under the headline "Accusation." These soldiers, who were serving in the support battalion of the Pushkin Higher Military Construction Engineering School, left the barracks and went to Riga.

In their letter they accuse the company sergeant major, B.D. Dudurich, and the battalion commander, Major S.P. Akulshin, "of the following violations of human rights: humiliating the indigenous nationality of Latvia, morally suppressing their subordinates, fueling interethnic discord, and employing nonregulation treatment..." The authors of the letter admit that on occasion perhaps they committed violations themselves in order to ensure greater credibility. However, in their opinion the extreme actions of commanders and tactless pronouncements by the company sergeant major about the Latvian people were the root cause of this.

Materials critical of the Armed Forces have been common in various mass media of the republic in recent months. The same PADOMYU YAUNATNE has published letters on many occasions relating "bitter" impressions of the service by Latvian soldiers, complaints by parents about disarray in the army, and so on. The stand of the editorial office is unambiguous: Perestroika processes have not affected the military sphere; the situation will change for the better only if the republic does not have to send its sons to serve far from their native home, if the national units disbanded in the 1950's are finally restored in Latvia.

[signed] V. Sebyakin, TASS correspondent, Riga

...and From the Standpoint of the Law

Could it be that appealing to the broad circles of the public is indeed necessary in order to root out scandalous practices in the subunit and call to account the officials who have created "unbearable" conditions for military service by Latvians? A TASS correspondent visited the Leningrad Garrison, the subunit where the 11 Latvian soldiers who signed the letter serve, in order to resolve this question.

His first short conversation was with the military prosecutor of the Leningrad Garrison judicial service, Colonel V.A. Boldarayn.

He said that pursuant to the USSR Law "On Criminal Penalties for Military Crimes," a criminal case has been filed against 13 servicemen from the Pushkin Higher Military Construction Engineering School. All facts outlined in the article "Accusation" will be carefully verified.

What happened?

Privates Yu. Minayevs, A. Stepanov, and A. Chentoritskis went AWOL and traveled to Riga. There they established contact with representatives of the National Front of Latvia, and turned up in the field of vision [as published] of representatives of the League of Women, A. Stankevich and A. Balyunya. Instead of sorting out what has happened and advising the soldiers to return to their unit, they proposed that the soldiers speak on the republic radio and denounce the army "customs." In the process they dropped a hint: For an action that serious, three persons would not be enough; it would be nice if other fellow servicemen, Latvians, also join in. Chentoritskis and company called the school and, through a switchboard operator they knew, informed their fellow countrymen about the situation which had emerged. Ten soldiers of the subunit whose ethnic emotions turned out to eclipse their responsibility for their actions went AWOL to Riga. As one of the fugitives declared, they did so to attract the attention of the public and express their protest.

However, not all them went away. Three of their fellow servicemen announced that they have minds of their own in explaining their decision to stay behind.

The soldiers were subsequently returned to the unit through the efforts of the command, military commissariat, and with the participation of relatives.

Several days later, when it became known that the investigation was underway, a group of Latvian young people picketed the building of the republic military commissariat demanding that "unfounded" charges against the fugitives be dropped. Threats were made that otherwise the next round of the draft for active military service would be disrupted.

Why did the soldiers resort to a measure as desperate as an escape? Representatives of seven nationalities, including Latvians, which account for 30 percent of the personnel, serve in the technical company of the instruction support battalion. All with whom I had occasion to talk, both officers and men, including those under investigation, maintain that there is no antagonism between soldiers of different nationalities, and the demands the superiors make on their subordinates do not depend on their nationality.

The rooms in the subunit are equipped in keeping with the requirements of regulations; all conditions are created for life, the soldiers' performance of their service duty, and the organization of their cultural leisure activities. Newspapers in the national languages, including PADOMYU YAUNATNE, are received by subscription. There is a long-distance phone in the compound of the school and soldiers may always talk to their relatives and loved ones. Contacts between the command and the relatives and local military commissariats is also established in the battalion. Parents often come to visit their sons. The command believes that this reinforces the healthy moral atmosphere and discipline in the military collective.

The deputy chief of the school, Colonel I.A. Svetlichnyy, says: "Certainly there are shortcomings in the organization of service and in indoctrination work. For a long time there was no regular company commander; his deputy was appointed recently. The exactingness of company Sergeant Major B.D. Dudurich at times transcended the limits of that prescribed by regulations; there were cases when he allowed himself to make insulting remarks addressed to his subordinates. Had the soldiers reported these violations, the necessary measures would have been taken immediately..."

Had they reported it... The battalion has a headquarters and three political officers; there are two officers and four warrant officers in the company—what else is needed to know the mood of the subordinates, their everyday needs and concerns? What degree of separation between individual superiors and soldiers does it take for the former to be unaware of the negative cases which disturbed the collectives and became one more factor prompting the violation of law because they were left without a response?

What do the fugitives themselves say?

Private A. Chentoritskis: "All of us wrote a little, and then we put it together. This is why I cannot explain some things which appear in the letter."

Private G. Benkis: "I was not writing for publication; it is not stated precisely in the letter, and about Major Akulshin it is too much..."

"We did not think about this"; "we did not believe it would go that far"; "we acted this way because we are young and impetuous"—almost everyone had such words to say.

Could it be that in other subunits of the battalion they are in sympathy with the content of the letter? The answers of 14 Latvian soldiers assembled for a conversation are unanimous: Latvians are not humiliated before the soldiers of other nationalities in their collectives. Incidentally, draftees from the Baltic republics account for over 60 percent of the battalion strength.

At a meeting of the school's party aktiv, communists provided an explanation for what has happened. Colonel

P.P. Yepenkov, chief of the school's political department, said that one of the main reasons lies in the fact that servicemen drafted from the Baltic area are susceptible to the active influence of the NFL, the NFE [People's Front of Estonia], and the Sajudis, which preach the ideas of creating national territorial armies, and of extremist forces which at times incite the soldiers to act in contravention of the law and call on them not to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. On the other hand, we communists should draw correct conclusions for working to explain the party's nationality policy under contemporary conditions...

Unfortunately such a conclusion was not drawn sooner.

The following question comes up: Why did the Latvian newspaper, which bills itself as a defender of the interests of Latvian young men, not bother to send its correspondent to Leningrad, to the school, as, for example, the newspaper ZA RODINU has done? Who profits from the publication of the tendentious materials?

Apparently those who are interested in stirring up negative attitudes toward military service needed to resuscitate the outrage of the public in order to try misleading this time around thousands of young people who are subject to the draft into the Armed Forces rather than just a dozen soldiers. After all, instigating, calling for harmful actions with dangerous consequences or for unseemly, criminal actions is called incitement.

We believe that the investigation will provide final answers to this question.

A. Danilin, special TASS correspondent, Leningrad

Readers' Opposition To Release of Students

18011019a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Sep 89 First Edition p 3

[Readers' letters: "Will the Word 'Duty' Lose Its Luster?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "On the Comprehensive Nature of Military Service"—this was the title of an article by Colonel General G. Krivosheyev published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 31 August of this year. It has generated numerous letters of response, some of which we are publishing today.

The mother of a soldier is writing this letter to you. I have read the article "On the Comprehensive Nature of Military Service" and have finally confirmed my opinion: The resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the early release of servicemen-students from active duty is incorrect and unconsidered. Why should some boys defend the motherland while others should not? How are the former better than the rest? Only in that they have forced their way into colleges (frequently with the help of their influential parents)?

It would be understandable to a degree if they stop drafting people into the Army from kolchozes [collective

farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] where a problem of utmost significance for the entire country is being solved in the environment of an acute manpower shortage. As far as engineers are concerned, we have a surplus of them everywhere: They are waiters, beer and kvass salesmen, barbers...

The law "On the Comprehensive Duty of Military Service" states: "All male citizens of the USSR are obligated to serve on active duty within the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces." Privileges in this matter for a segment of our young men are socially unjust. We cannot derive laws proceeding from the interests of just one category of the populace (even if intellectually "gifted"), and to indicate through the same laws to other people that they are second-class.

I would like to support the opinion that the duration of service needs to be revised. I believe it should be 2 years for everyone. Service and combat training in the Navy should be organized so that the servicemen master the materiel and weaponry within much shorter periods of time. In this matter, the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy], military commissariats, and general schools should render substantial assistance. Recently I read in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA that in the FRG military personnel serve 15 months, in Italy 18 months, and in France 12 months. They manage to master their specialties, don't they? I am convinced that our boys are just as intelligent.

[signed] L. Kiseleva, Sverdlovsk

Following my career service in the Soviet Army, I have been working at a production association in Moscow. I feel personally and directly the unfriendly attitude toward our Armed Forces on the part of the technical intelligentsia: "The officers are martinets, and the soldiers are made stupid during service..." On the other hand, the applause was tumultuous when the employees heard an announcement on the radio about the early release of soldier-students from the service. This is not surprising. Few of our engineers have performed soldier duty.

This fact also testifies graphically to the attitude toward the sacred duty of USSR citizen to defend the socialist motherland. Out of the four lecturers who spoke at our organization this year, three built their lectures on picking on the Soviet Army and its officer corps.

I would like to ask the USSR people's deputies in uniform: Why did they mainly prefer to keep silent at the congress and the session of our parliament, specifically, when the issue of the early release of servicemen-students was being resolved? They should know that, say, in the Far East soldiers are not relieved from sentry duty for days. You can imagine how hard it is going to be for them after 176,000 of their peers are released from active duty. Therefore, the mothers of these soldiers will hardly bring bouquets of flowers to the table of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Our people do not have to know about the Army by hearsay. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would be very right if it were to inform the readers about the consequences of releasing the former students from active duty.

The article by Colonel General G. Krivosheyev is right in mentioning the "overproduction" of engineers in our country. At our enterprise, they even occupy positions for which secondary vocational education is needed. I know they even hold positions as bath attendants.

Now, following the resolution on the release of students, discussions are underway among the technical intelligentsia of the enterprise about placing their children in colleges by hook or by crook. After all, God forbid, they may get drafted into the Army!

For obvious reasons, I am communicating my name to the editorial office only.

[signed] K.F., Moscow

I entirely share the apprehension of Colonel General G. Krivosheyev that continuing attempts to exempt still new categories of young people from serving in the Army may again bring about a "worker-peasant" army. Indeed, young people with "intelligentsia" backgrounds are trying to avoid military service.

At the same time, to my mind, the author exaggerates the quantitative and qualitative significance of the student body for the Soviet Armed Forces. First-year students have accounted for the main segment of students drafted for service in the military before 1989. What does their training amount to? I have been a student myself, and I know that in the first year they study general educational subjects, and special subjects are uncommon. This is why I doubt that first-year students are very valuable to the army. The graduates of technical schools and vocational technical schools which are fully trained should be of a much higher value.

Besides, why do Colonel General Krivosheyev and some other authors of similar publications keep silent about 176,000 student-servicemen accounting for just over 4 percent of the total strength of our Armed Forces? Apparently a reduction of the Army by 500,000 does not bother them, but they raise the alarm concerning the release of 176,000 students. What is the logic of this?

[signed] L. Glazachev, Tula

The early release of servicemen-students this year and the granting of draft deferments in the long run will definitely invite abuses in admissions to colleges. Kind-hearted fathers and mothers will do everything to "place" their children in any college at all as long as they do not end up in the Army. This will inevitably bring about an increase in the number of mediocre, if not good-for-nothing, engineers, physicians, and lawyers among the graduates...

The existing system of deferments, demographic and other problems have already brought about lower

requirements for the physical and moral-psychological characteristics of draftees. Hence, the number of soldiers convicted before being drafted into the Army in some units comes to between 15 and 20 percent, and that of alcoholics, drug and substance addicts, and mentally handicapped to 25 percent. I am saying this on the basis of what I happened to encounter while serving in the Transcaucasian Border District in 1976 through 1978 and in the North Caucasus Military District in 1987 through 1989.

Meanwhile, the appropriate demands vital to the Army can be made only on the physically, psychologically, and socially healthy person. Otherwise, the provisions of the military oath and articles of military regulations will simply not amount to anything.

[signed] S. Shcherbakov, party functionary, Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast

The article by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, was discussed at the Main Headquarters of the Navy. The opinion of all participants in the meeting was that the publication is topical; issues associated with the defense of the country are outlined in it sharply, objectively, and in a competent manner.

The view was voiced that this has been one of the few recent articles in which the issues of performing military service are raised so topically, in a businesslike and bold manner. At the same time, some people are surprised by the fact that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries very few articles by servicemen-people's deputies of the USSR which would refer to problems associated with the decline in the prestige of service in the army and the navy and would rebuff the biased attacks against the Armed Forces which occur in the press and on the radio and TV.

[signed] Rear Admiral V. Lyakin, deputy chief of the Main Headquarters of the Navy

Party Control Commission on Benefits to Afghan Vets

*18011019b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major I. Ivanyuk: "About the 'Afgantsy' Soldiers"]

[Text] The issue of the implementation of party and government decisions on preferences for former soldier-internationalists in Kostroma Oblast has been considered at a meeting of the Committee of Party Control [KPK] of the CPSU Central Committee.

This issue was on the agenda of the CPSU Central Committee KPK not by chance, but as a natural consequence of the attention paid by the party to such elements of state policy as the social security of war and labor veterans, retirees, and other groups of the populace

which need special help and support. Caring for and being attentive to those who have performed their soldierly internationalist duty at present, in the time of peace, is not just a humane act; this shows the civic attitude of all of us.

Some work in this sphere is being done in Kostroma Oblast, as the inspection by the CPSU Central Committee KPK has shown. Most of the 1,365 soldier-internationalists have been given jobs; many are continuing their study. All families of those who died—and there are several dozen of them in the oblast—have received lump-sum grants-in-aid in the amount authorized. Issues of allocating housing, installing telephones, health care, and trade services are being resolved. However, as the report of the commission stresses, the problem is that everything is done slowly and at times gets bogged down in bureaucratic procedures. If the "afgantsy" [Afghan veterans] are not asking for anything then it is fine.

The inspection has shown that many soldier-internationalists are forced to be cooped up in cramped conditions, and at times in conditions altogether unfit for life. For example, N. Khudyakov, an employee of the car depot at Sharya station, occupied a room with a floor space of 12 square meters together with his wife and two young children. S. Kochetkov lived in a semi-basement room together with his family; despite many appeals, the Nerekhta City Executive Committee could not find an opportunity to allocate normal housing for him. Similar cases were found in Buyskiy, Sudislavskiy, Soligalichskiy, and other rayons. Seven disabled "afgantsy" still do not have apartments.

The housing problem is, perhaps, the most acute for the former soldier-internationalists. At the oblast center alone, there are more than 200 of them on the waiting list. Many have been waiting for apartments for many years despite the preferences they are entitled to.

One of the reasons for the delays and at times direct violations of the housing law is the fact that the oblast executive committee and trade union council have long failed to introduce into the rules on registering citizens in need of improved housing conditions the additions concerning soldier-internationalists which came into effect as long ago as 1983.

Of course, the oblast has objective difficulties and problems. The chairman of the executive committee of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, A. Yeremin, and the second secretary of the oblast party committee, V. Tkachenko, who were given the floor at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee KPK, referred to the measures planned for solving them in the nearest future. However, as members of the KPK pointed out justly in their speeches, this is perhaps not the point. The soldier-internationalists have a very good idea of the situation:

There are no spare apartments or phones or hospital beds. What hurts them most is the official indifference they encounter in their daily existence. Could not the issue of artificial limbs for disabled war veterans O. Yegorov and S. Smirnov be solved, and hearing aids or a referral to a sanatorium be provided for someone else without a commission having to come from Moscow?

Such cases cannot be justified by any circumstances. The fact that, for example, 70 percent of the 270 "afgantsy" checked need major medical treatment while there are no proper conditions for this cannot but cause alarm. By now 32 beds at the hospital where the disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War are treated and five beds in every rayon hospital have been allotted for the intensive observation of former soldier-internationalists. Still, much more needs to be done than has been accomplished already.

As was noted at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee KPK, the incorrect opinion is sometimes found that meeting the needs of soldier-internationalists is solely the province of military commissariats. Of course, some of the blame for the shortcomings found revolves on them. The oblast military commissar, Colonel N. Sazonov, and the chief of the political division, Colonel A. Bozhok, who were present at the meeting, were cited for the lack of initiative on their part.

At the same time, this is the task of all state and mass organizations, and primarily of local party committees. The overall principled and demanding approach to these issues depends on them. As was stressed at the meeting, this has not been assured in the oblast yet. Here is a characteristic example—party penalties have been meted out to only two officials for violating the legislation on preferences for the soldier-internationalists, and then on the initiative of the procuracy organs.

It is exactly through a joint effort that a mechanism for implementing the preferences and priorities accorded must be created whereby soldier-"afgantsy" will not have to go knocking on doors and begging for them. The new approach is gradually asserting itself in Kostroma Oblast. Certain things have already been done since the inspection. All soldier-internationalists have been issued "Certificates of Entitlement to Preferences." This is a substantial addition to previously published brochures with the enumeration of these preferences.

Still, we cannot fail to see how late these simple and efficient measures are, how hard to come by simple human words of compassion and support are which cannot be replaced by any privileges. Certainly all of this leaves people bitter and insulted. Besides, this compromises the policy of the party and the state aimed at taking care in every way possible of those who have honorably performed their duty to the motherland. This cannot be forgotten.

'Army Aviation' Lack of Coordination with Ground Forces*18010876 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Sep 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Col V. Pismennyy, deputy commander, Army Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Discrepancy in Guidance Documents Causes Lack of Coordination Between Army Aviation and Motorized Rifle Troops"]

[Text] Helicopter Squadron Commander Major S. Sitnikov, who saw combat in Afghanistan, was the cause of an incident in peacetime combat training. It happened during a training exercise that was being held in the Carpathian Military District. One evening one of the combat helicopter groups was assigned the mission of providing support to motorized riflemen by delivering a strike against "enemy" troops at daybreak. The exact time and area of the strike were indicated. The crews entered the flight routes onto the maps and worked out the details of the operation. That same evening the mission was discussed several times, and at the first light of day Squadron Commander Major S. Sitnikov led his group to the forward edge of the battle area.

The ground seemed to fly under the helicopter quickly, since the craft was flying at very low altitude. Nevertheless, the squadron commander, who passed through a hard school in the skies of Afghanistan, "caught" the indicated landmarks with his experienced eye. He spotted the particular forest edge. Time to take action!

"Attack!" ordered the major. The helicopters maneuvered and flew quickly in the direction in which the targets were supposedly located. However, the squadron commander was the first to observe that the area was devoid of combat materiel and personnel. But there was a real "enemy"—a motorized rifle subdivision—at the training session; the helicopters were to simulate firing their guns and launching their missiles.

The squadron commander made a second pass for a strike and anxiously queried the air controller: Where is the enemy? Why was the attack maneuver authorized if there is no enemy in the particular area? However, the radio was silent. The mission was to be accomplished—that is why the order was issued.

"Attack!" The helicopters flew a second time over the windy area of training ground. They delivered their strike against an empty place.

What had happened? Let us analyze what had transpired in the training session along with the squadron commander. It seems that the "enemy" was indeed located in the indicated area in the evening. However, the commander of the opposing motorized battalion realized before the day was out that he had been detected by reconnaissance, including aerial reconnaissance. During the night—let us give credit to the skill and training of the motorized riflemen—the battalion observed all rules

of camouflage to move out of the area. However, Major Sitnikov failed to carry out follow-up reconnaissance.

The question arose of punishing the squadron commander, even though training sessions are held so that one side emerges the victor, while the other side learns his lessons from the defeat. That is the purpose of combat training. However, a strict approach was used in the case of the squadron commander, since Major Sitnikov permitted the occurrence of serious errors that were inexcusable for an officer possessing combat experience.

Nevertheless, the incident was the cause of much deliberation, since it seems that the motorized riflemen, who were receiving support from the airborne squadron, saw that the helicopters were attacking an area that was devoid of an enemy. However, none of the ground forces commanders thought of informing them of the situation.

Major Sitnikov made the accurate observation, and I am in complete agreement with him, that many ground forces commanders possess only limited knowledge of the capabilities of army aviation. In some cases their training falls short of today's requirements. Even the commander of a motorized rifle regiment has occasion to coordinate with aviation. I myself witnessed how a division commander of little experience ordered army aircraft into the air on the slightest pretence. When it became necessary to deliver a powerful strike against targets accessible only to aviators, it was discovered that the helicopters had already expended their supplies (ammunition, fuel).

I do not intend to lay all the blame on others, of course. It must be admitted that in some cases aviators themselves are insufficiently trained in combined-arms tactics. Direct coordination between army aviation and ground forces is usually effected by squadron commanders, who rarely possess the knowledge and training required for this. However, Major Sitnikov does possess the necessary knowledge and, as indicated above, the combat experience. I asked why he committed the error and why he did not proceed to the forward edge of the battle area to ascertain the enemy's location. I was told that for him to do so would mean rating a "two." That is standard.

It is true that guidance documents do contain this discrepancy. This is because helicopter battlefield performance is evaluated by combined-arms commanders. While this in essence is proper, evaluation should include the element of army aviation tactics. In that case it would be clear that an evaluation criterion such as "flying beyond the forward edge of the battle area" may not always be applicable. As far as that goes, I believe that this regulation is patently obsolete, the same as the approach to carrying out tactical flying exercises, as explained below.

If the exercise is organized by combined-arms commanders, army aviation must be included. This is required by a number of guidance documents. On the

other hand, if an exercise is set up by aviation commanders, no one is obligated to provide support by way of ground-forces personnel or materiel. Today it is impossible for a squadron or air regiment commander to do justice to an exercise without the participation of service branches and combat arms. At times this is the primary cause of oversimplification and relaxation of demands in combat training.

Another problem surfaces in this regard: the need for close operational communication between headquarters of Air Forces having army aviation at their disposal and commanders of ground forces. Today the combined-arms commander accomplishes all combat training missions, even those that are minor, with the assistance of helicopters, which he requests by virtually contacting the district Air Force commander.

I firmly believe that the commander-pilot and the combined-arms commander must not be taught separately in the process of joint combat training, on the training ground, in the exercise. I am of the opinion that army aviation in all its activities must operate shoulder to shoulder with those for whom it "works" on the battlefield. It should be bound to ground-forces subunits by a common will, a single plan of the commander. But of which one?

Opinions vary on this score. Some people are of the opinion that insufficient knowledge of aviation on the part of ground forces personnel may render a negative influence on air combat training of pilots. There is some justification for the feeling that helicopter pilots subject to the order of combined-arms commanders may be treated as pariahs.

Let us return to the incident involving Major Sitnikov's group. Major A. Bulikhov, who is in charge of aerial reconnaissance, assumed a detached position. According to him, army aviation is employed by the district Air Force commander, who has the services of a special command team, which should be held responsible for the actions of helicopter pilots. After this suggestion was made, the commander of the motorized rifle division chose not to accept the responsibility of helicopter control.

Also, how is it possible to fail to set up communication between army aviation on the one hand and tactical air defense and artillery on the other—which situation did occur at the exercise? It is a fact that antiaircraft gunners counter the work of helicopters with simulated fire. However, it happens that as they follow the aerial "enemy" with their gun tubes and missiles they are not aware that they have been "annihilated" by helicopters operating from a distance. It also happens that aviators do not function at their best, in that they are "knocked down" before they can employ their weapons. How is one to establish who lost and who won? What advantage does this kind of training offer?

It is also often the case that artillery positions are merely markings on a map, as far as we are concerned. However,

it is a fact that when live ammunition is employed in training, helicopter flight paths and projectile trajectories are very close together. We need more coordination if we are to prevent untoward incidents. In addition, artillery should neutralize enemy air defense weapons before the helicopters attack. If it does not, aviators will suffer considerable unjustified losses.

We encountered virtually all these problems in the course of combat activity in Afghanistan. Major Sitnikov fought there, and he has just recently seen for himself that the application of this valuable experience to routine combat training is lifeless and casual. This concerns both aviators and authorities in service branch headquarters of the USSR Armed Forces. Nonetheless, for some reason there is a delay in resolving these vital problems. I believe that army aviation should assume a definite role, as dictated by the defensive doctrine.

Volga, Ural Military Districts Combined

*18010881 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Sep 89 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense".]

[Text] In connection with the reduction of the USSR's Armed Forces, from 1 September 1989 the Ural Military District is abolished, and the Volga Military District is reorganized into Volga-Ural Military District.

The legal successor of the former Ural and Volga Military Districts is the Volga-Ural Military District (the administration of the military district is in the city of Kuybyshev).

Reduction Leads to Expanded Work by Main Inspectorate

*18010882 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Sep 89 First Edition pp 1-2*

[Interview with Army Gen M. Sorokin, USSR people's deputy, USSR deputy minister of defense, and chief inspector, by Col V. Bogdanovskiy and Lt Col I. Yesyutin, under the rubric "Combat Readiness: Parameters of Quality": "From the Inspectorate's Viewpoint"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade General of the Army, it has not been easy getting to meet with you: first you are in one district, then another. Is being so busy associated with the peculiarities of the current stage of development of our Armed Forces or is this the usual, normal life of the Main Inspectorate?

[Sorokin] You may be right. Never before has the Main Inspectorate worked so intensively and with such intensity as it has been lately. First of all, this is of course associated with the restructuring processes in the Armed Forces and with the increase in the demands on their combat readiness and discipline. Hence both the change in the content and the increase in the volume of the Main

Inspectorate's work, whose role as the main control organ of the Ministry of Defense is naturally increasing.

I will cite this fact for a comparison. In past years, the Main Inspectorate took 2-3 large formations of the Armed Forces, such as a district, group of forces, or fleet, for an inspection. This year we inspected the Carpathian Military District, the Central Group of Forces, the Northern Fleet, and a number of formations of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force. This is not counting complex inspections, for example, such as inspections of scientific research institutions of the Ministry of Defense and of military builders.

It is quite understandable that with such an intensity of work it is difficult to catch officers, generals, and admirals of the Main Inspectorate in their offices. Our work place is in the military units and on ships. You see, the combat readiness and fighting effectiveness of the Army and Navy cannot be seasonal.

This year has also been intense for me personally. As deputy minister of defense and as a USSR people's deputy, I often have to visit various regions of the country and abroad, and delve into problems of military and labor collectives. There are many concerns associated with the unilateral reduction under way and the reorganization of the Armed Forces and the withdrawal of our troops from the territory of allied states.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What, in your opinion, are the most noticeable changes taking place in the activities of the Main Inspectorate with regard to perestroika?

[Sorokin] The well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee clearly defined the direction and nature of work of military personnel in the new conditions. In the summer of 1987, I was appointed chief inspector and had the opportunity to become familiar with materials from many years of inspections. If you compare them with what we have today, the difference is appreciable.

But then again, a lot of new things have appeared in the approach to the inspectorate's work itself. In particular, as was stated above, the methods of inspecting are being improved—the inspections are becoming more extensive and more serious. The work style of our specialists is changing. There is less paperwork. Emphasis in inspecting the troops and fleet forces is being placed on a practical check of their combat proficiency directly at exercises and on cruises. This affects all formations being inspected without exception, including the special troops. For example, the preparation of repair bodies is now being checked during the course of practical work in field conditions. Exercises, as a rule, are conducted with live fire and are combined-arms exercises in nature. They involve artillery, aviation, engineering, chemical, and other attached and supporting forces and assets. We conduct more than 80 percent of the inspection exercises on a so-called defensive theme. Of course, special attention is given to checking the training of officer personnel and their ability independently to organize combat operations and control forces and assets of various combat arms.

Working in the units and on ships, we also proceed from the fact that the inspection itself should be instructive for personnel. Therefore, we strive to see that each exercise or performance evaluation exercise is an example for those being tested in terms of organization and support and helps improve the methods skills of command personnel, that not a single minute is wasted, and that each person senses the intensity of a combat situation. Such an approach, it seems to me, corresponds to the greatest extent to the requirement to teach the troops and fleet forces what is needed in war and makes it possible to evaluate their training more objectively. In addition, this helps strengthen the prestige of the Main Inspectorate, which is also quite important.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But the prestige of the Main Inspectorate was very high before, too. An evaluation received on an inspection from its specialists was unofficially considered a point higher in the troops...

[Sorokin] This prestige, as you know, was created not by one generation of highest trained military professionals. Suffice it to say that such prominent military leaders as L.A. Govorov, I.S. Konev, K.K. Rokossovskiy, I.Ye. Petrov, I.Kh. Bagramyan, K.S. Moskalenko, and other worked in the Main Inspectorate at various times. The current staff of the Main Inspectorate values both the prestige and experience they inherited. We have highly qualified specialists, officers, generals, and admirals with much service experience and who know their job down to the finest details. At the same time, a new manner is taking shape in the inspection work, and we are searching for inspection methods which best correspond to current requirements.

This is dictated by life itself and by the course of perestroika in the Army and Navy, aimed at ensuring qualitative parameters of their combat readiness. Today, if it can be said this way, inspection is becoming more democratic. No, it is not a matter of some relaxation of discipline. We are simply looking more closely at the process of training and education, taking into account more fully the opinions of those being inspected, and trying to make common property the experience of resolving certain problems that exists in leading collectives. In other words, we not only record the shortcomings, which unfortunately was the case before, but also seek to eliminate them within the time allotted and our capabilities.

I will not dwell on examples, although there are such, of course. I will only state one, in my opinion, fundamental aspect. Representatives of the Main Inspectorate often manage to eliminate in a short time shortcomings that have been building up over months, and sometimes years. What does this indicate? As a rule, it indicates inefficiency and sometimes basic irresponsibility of certain officials locally. Some are still waiting for instructions and directives for every occurrence in life.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade General of the Army, in addition to the reduction in the Armed Forces, the structure of large units and units is changing. Does the

Main Inspectorate take this into account when it inspects these formations? In general, how are the reorganizations measures in the Army and Navy affecting the nature of combat training?

[Sorokin] The two parties here—the inspector and the unit being inspected—are called upon to proceed from one principle: neither the reorganization nor the reduction should be detrimental to combat readiness. Work must be carried out in such a way that each does his job: the subunits and units being reduced work with the problems of reduction; the rest work with intensive training, but brought under the new structure. You see, now we have to carry out essentially the same volume of tasks with fewer personnel. And we not only have to maintain the former level of combat readiness, but also bring it to a higher level. This can be done only by increasing the effectiveness of combat training, organization, and discipline. This is precisely what we emphasize during our inspections. And it must be said that there are considerable reserves here. These include reviving tactics as an art of organizing and conducting combat, at the basis of which is the commanders' ability to win not by numbers but by skill; using the entire potential of modern equipment; improving the methods level of the training process...

How are the organizational and staff changes affecting the quality of combat training?

This can be illustrated by the results of the last inspections. Take, say, the Central Group of Forces. Like everywhere else, significant changes are taking place here in the structure of motorized rifle and tank large units and units. The number of tanks and other equipment of an offensive nature is being reduced, and the subunits are simultaneously being reinforced with antitank and antiaircraft weapons... In short, the changes are marked. But combat training, as the inspection showed, is proceeding in a planned manner with qualitative practicing of topics and with an orientation on high end results. For example, tankmen of the guards regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col N. Chemeris demonstrated good proficiency. Soldiers of the Guards Irkutsk-Pinsk Motorized Rifle Division imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Gds Col V. Neverov have high results. Aviation units successfully passed the inspection.

We saw a different picture in a motorized rifle division in the Carpathian Military District, where a number of shortcomings in proficiency of personnel and professional training of officers were identified as a result of the inspection.

As we see, the effect of some or other measures of an organizational nature on combat training is largely determined by the work style of personnel and their approach to problems of training and education. For example, we analyzed the reasons for the low level of weapon training in the battalion commanded by Maj A. Semenov. It turned out that the system itself of organizing combat training in the regiment was marked by rush work, cramming, and stereotype. Training sessions are disrupted and postponed.

Night training in the unit is ignored altogether... How can they expect good results? It turns out that people do not count on day-to-day labor, but on some lottery luck.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is known that new things always have a difficult time making their way in the world—creativity runs into formalism, innovation contradicts existing instructions, and initiative and non-standard thinking encounter resistance to change.

[Sorokin] Based on inspections and the results of analysis, we are preparing appropriate proposals for the minister of defense to the General Staff and to other authorities and departments. These may be the most varied issues affecting, say, improving the organizational and manning structure of the troops and fleet forces, their training and technical supply systems, or changes in combat training performance standards. As a rule, a timely reaction follows our proposals.

Now, for example, restructuring the system of training the troops and fleet forces in accordance with the defensive orientation of the military doctrine appears to be most complicated. Quite a few problems have accumulated here. What is the reason for this? During almost the entire postwar period, we assigned a secondary role to defensive actions in the training of personnel, staffs, and commanders. Naturally, the notions of many concerning defensive combat are still on the 1950's level. We must overcome all of this, which requires, as you are aware, a certain breaking both psychologically and organizationally. I think that the new training programs, courses, regulations, and field manuals will help this to a certain extent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] By the way, about the new programs. What can you say already today about their effectiveness from the Main Inspectorate's point of view?

[Sorokin] I believe that the new documents are largely proving their worth. First of all, they are bringing the training requirements closer to the realities and requirements of life of the troops and fleet forces. Independence in planning enables commanders to manipulate training time and more objectively affect the quality of working out certain questions. They demonstrate more initiative, search, and experiment. Of course, everything here depends on the programs. We need a more effectively functioning system of commander's training and higher personal interest of officers in raising their professional level. We need modern training equipment.

The latter seems especially urgent to me. Modern tanks, aviation complexes, ships—these are very complicated systems that are packed with electronics and instruments. But training equipment has lagged behind the development of technology, and industry will hardly be able to make up this gap, especially now in the conditions of the conversion of military production. In this regard, it seems important to me to develop initiative more aggressively from below and more boldly involve troop and fleet

innovators in creating training aids. We have many examples of training devices created by skilled craftsmen being just as good as those made by industry.

Secondly, introducing new programs is a sign of the times, you see, an orientation of combat training on mastering the defensive doctrine. From this standpoint, I think, some finishing touches still must be put on them. But in general, quite a number of experiments are being conducted in the Army and Navy today. During the course of this search, undoubtedly, there will appear particles of new experience that warrant attention. It is important to notice them in time and utilize them effectively. Thus, I think, a well-founded conversation about the programs is yet to come.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You talked about experience. In today's conditions, when the organizational and establishment structure of the troops and fleet forces is being restructured, combat training and the lessons and experience brought to light by the Main Inspectorate take on special value. How are they being reflected in the practice of combat training?

[Sorokin] First of all, we strive to structure our work in a way that as many people as possible know about its results—especially command and political personnel. On completion of inspections, we hold a detailed critique, where we note not only the shortcomings but also the positive experience and recommend for use approaches being used in other districts, groups of forces, and fleets which, in our opinion, are worthy. In so doing, we encourage in every way possible commanders who are devoted to their main mission, are knowledgeable, and know how to train personnel.

Secondly, we analyze our work. We select everything valuable for future inspections. We prepare a summary report based on the results of the inspection. This is used to issue a USSR Ministry of Defense order which also reflects the experience of leading units and ships.

In short, we do not hide either the experience or the requirements which are imposed on those being inspected. We do not invent anything over and above the approved programs, standards, courses, and regulations. Only the methods of the inspections are changing. In this respect, as I already said, the Main Inspectorate is not standing still.

Reactions To New Regulations

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[Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on new regulations:
"Drafts of New Regulations: Opinions, Commentaries]

Restore What Has Been Forgotten

On the Principle of Absolute Obedience.

...An order is always to be obeyed? What if it is illegal, criminal, or unjust?... We cannot go on pretending that this problem does not exist.

Back in 1724, in his decree "On Obedience of Subordinates to Their Commanders", Peter I prescribed: "All subordinates are to be obedient to their commanders in all that is not contrary to regulations. But if it is contrary, then by no means must he do it... Rather he must explain to his commander that it is contrary to regulations, and if the latter does not listen, then he must protest and report to the higher commander"... This principle was retained in Russian military legislation right up to the October Revolution. It could also be seen in the military regulations of 1919, 1925, and 1937, where it was stated that service members were obliged to carry out all service orders of their superiors, with the exception of those that were patently criminal.

Subsequently (and this was the logical continuation of the development of events in the country at the end of the 30s), there was a departure from the principle of the conditional binding force of an order, and all subsequent regulations of the Armed Forces contained the principle of absolute obedience. What is more, the Disciplinary Regulations of the Red Army of 1940 granted commanders the right to use force and weapons to ensure the execution of any order.

I agree that the conventional saying, "Doubts may adorn the philosopher, but they ruin the soldier", is to some extent fair. But why do these same doubts not visit the hot heads of some commanders and superiors? According to statistics of the Main Military Procuracy, thousands of illegal orders are issued every year. Who has measured the moral and material harm they have done?...

In short, I believe that article 7 of the draft Disciplinary Regulation in this section does not correspond to the spirit of the times. I propose the following wording: "A service member is obliged unconditionally, precisely, and immediately to obey the orders of commanders and superiors. A patently criminal order should not be obeyed. A service member is obliged to report an illegal order to the higher commander and deputy commander (chief) for political affairs. The commander (chief) who issues an illegal order, and the subordinate who obeys a patently criminal order, bear responsibility in accordance with current law".

Major (Justice) A. Pchelintsev, candidate of juridical sciences.

Letters concurring with the opinion of A. Pchelintsev came from P. Andrushko, Docent of the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology of the Kiev State University ("Court practice and the theory of criminal law say that an order must be obeyed, except one that is patently criminal, and that if a criminal order is executed, the subordinate is not relieved of responsibility"); Sr. Lt. A. Posokhov ("Recently an oral order was issued for the reassignment of officers to barracks until 'the establishment of regulation-governed order and firm discipline, and until combat and political training are fully planned'"); Capt. V. Davydov ("Article 21 of the draft Interior Service Regulations should end with the words: 'For an order that is not economically supported or that induces a subordinate to

violate socialist legality, the senior officer bears responsibility, including criminal"); Maj. A. Gavrilenko ("They should write that orders contradicting laws and orders of high commanders are not to be obeyed in peacetime, since, for example, orders of the Minister of Defense are known by all, from the platoon leader to the commanding general, while the number of oral instructions contradicting them is enormous); and others. Colonel (Justice, ret.) V. Lomonov called to remind us that non-obedience of "unjust" orders is stipulated in the regulations of the armies of the GDR, France, the FRG, etc.

Listen to Specialists

On Maintaining the Health of Service Members

...How can a man without medical training judge the gravity of an illness, possible complications, etc.? But this happens here in practice at times. The doctor writes out a certificate for a service member, saying that he needs to be relieved of service obligations, and the commander fails to "ratify" it, appending an instruction of the type: "In connection with service necessity, he is allowed one day for illness, but not now, a week from now". Hence the service members with chronic illnesses, and sometimes foolish losses...

In this regard, I propose that article 393 of the draft Regulations say that service members are relieved of service obligations due to illness by the doctor's decision.

(Capt. of Medical Service S. Vudyanu)

Make It the Law

Regarding Mandatory Leave For Soldiers and Sailors

I believe it is time to establish mandatory leave for extended service personnel, for instance, up to 5 days for each year of service, and no earlier than 10 months (or some other time period) from the moment the military oath is taken.

This measure, it seems to me, not only would greatly intensify the ties of the Army with the people, but also fulfill the constitutional right of every Soviet person to an annual vacation and raise the morale of privates and sergeants.

This innovation could be stipulated in the draft of the Disciplinary Regulations, and its article 36, on short-term leaves and commendation procedures could be abolished.

Maj. S. Karnaukhov

This proposal is supported and expanded by Maj. Yu. Trofimov ("A service member must have the right to go on leave at least twice in his service time, not counting leave for family circumstances. If he has unsatisfactory evaluations in any subject of training, or a flagrant violation of military discipline, he is deprived of the right to leave for 6 months from the day of the incident"); company warrant officer S. Velitskiy ("... Leave, up to 10 days, not counting time en route"); Sr. Warrant Officer A. Karkh ("These

days leave is not a commendation, but a vital necessity for a young man. Would it not be better to make the strictest punishment not arrest, but a reduction in leave by a certain number of days for committing a certain violation"); Pvt. V. Petrov and fellow service members (the letter has 11 signatures) ("Establish a longer leave for service members who have served under harsh climatic conditions, or have been exposed to harmful substances and radiation... introduce a 3-day leave for visits by relatives of the soldier...").

Especially Stipulate

On the Protection of a Principled Commander

...We, mothers whose children already serve in the Army, or are just preparing for the draft, cannot rest easy knowing that their fellow service members might harass them. This circumstance compelled us to read the drafts of the Armed Forces Regulations.

We urge that a provision be inserted in the Regulations forbidding the punishment of any officer who discovers unauthorized relations and resists them. Perhaps for this we also need to provide for a commendation. Then, we believe, commanders will not cover up violations, but on the contrary, seek them out...

M. Prokop'yeva,
Ye. Khizhnyakova,
S. Pautova,
O. Nikitenko.

...I would like for the Regulations to have a paragraph or provision saying that a commander cannot be punished for a guilty subordinate (of course, a malicious violator)...

S. Naon, age 56, former Guards Private

Similar views on this subject were expressed by Capt. Kutenkov ("Article 54 of the draft Interior Service Regulation requires that there be no cover-ups, but does not protect an honorable, principled commander... The prerequisites are created for a mutual cover-up..."); Maj. V. Kochergin ("Responsibility is provided for covering up of violations of military discipline by commanders, but there is no ban on prosecuting the commander for the violations of his subordinates (after all, it sometimes happens that an officer doesn't even remember the soldier's name, and the latter is just about to cause a major problem). Ultimately this is the basic reason for all cover-ups."); V. Polonnikov ("An index of the work to strengthen military discipline should be not the number of violations, but the steps that the commander takes to establish prescribed order in the subunit. If we do not affirm this in the Army as the norm, talk about eradicating unauthorized relations will remain just talk"); Maj. V. Pruss, Sr. Lt. Sergin, Warrant Officer A. Yakimchuk, and others.

Interview With New Commander of Volga-Ural Military District

18010884b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 89 First edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview with Col Gen A. Makashov, Commander of Volga-Ural Military District: "Problems of the New District"]

[Text] We talk with Col Gen A. Makashov, recently appointed commanding general of the Volga-Ural Military District

Reference File

Col Gen Makashov, Albert Mikhaylovich was born in 1938 in the village of Levaya Rossosh in the Voronezh oblast. His father was on extended service in the Red Army as a company first sergeant, and during the war became an officer, a senior lieutenant, and was demobilized as disabled.

Albert Makashov was a cadet during the first great reduction of the Armed Forces. After graduation from the Voronezh Suvorov Military School, he studied in three combined-arms schools, the Tambov and Poltava, which were eliminated, and the Tashkent school. Then service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, as commander of a reconnaissance platoon, group, and later, company. In the Transcaucasus Military District Makashov also commanded a reconnaissance company, was reconnaissance officer for a tank regiment, and commander of a motorized rifle battalion.

After graduation from the Frunze Military Academy, Albert Mikhaylovich went on to positions as regimental commander, deputy commander and commander, for four and a half years, of a motorized rifle division in the Kiev Military District. Then there was training in the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Makashov graduated with a gold medal, just as he had earlier from the Frunze Academy. Subsequent service: first deputy commander, commander of a combined-arms army, first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA told its readers about the work of General Makashov as the commandant of the Special Region in Yerevan. His previous position was as commander of the Ural Military District, where Albert Mikhaylovich was elected a People's Deputy of the USSR.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Albert Mikhaylovich, what does the Volga-Ural military district, formed on 1 Sep of this year, comprise?

[Makashov] Until recently, as you know, there were Ural and Volga military districts. In connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces, the Ural district was disbanded, and the Volga district was reorganized into the Volga-Ural military district.

The territory is enormous—more than 1,623 thousand square kilometers. More than 40 million people live in

the region. Of them a little more than 60 percent are Russian and 33.5 percent are representatives of the native ethnic groups of the autonomous republics.

The new district inherits the traditions both of the Volga and the Ural districts...

The names alone are stirring. Frunze, Blyukher, Chapayev, Azin, Tukhachevskiy, Gay, Kutyakov... In these parts their military talents were revealed. And divisions? The 24th Samaro-Ulyanovskaya Zheleznaya, 25th Chapayevskaya, 26th Zlatoustovskaya... In the Great Patriotic War, more than three thousand diverse formations were sent from the banks of the Volga and from the Urals to the front, among them, the renowned Ural Volunteer Tank Corps.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are the characteristic features of the district?

[Makashov] The Volga-Ural Military District is an internal, deep district. In such districts the training of men in the spirit of constant readiness to defend the Motherland, the preparation of youth for service, is the focus.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What about the troops?

[Makashov] In addition to regular combat training, they have many additional tasks. Service now is associated with great physical and moral loads: there are not enough men. More than once I heard a joke that reflects the specifics of the district: here, they say, you have to give orders to yourself, and then carry them out yourself...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does this not pose a threat for the officers, that they will lose some of their professional qualities?

[Makashov] If there is good, responsible organization of commander's training, there is no threat. What is more, we have favorable conditions for professional improvement of the officers. For instance, in the All-Army Competitions this year, four representatives of the Ural and Volga districts won prizes.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does reorganization of the district involve reduction in the number of officer positions?

[Makashov] Naturally. But mainly at the administrative level. Officers who have served out their authorized terms of service are being discharged to the reserves. For two weeks we had a commission from the center operating here, ready to receive and listen to each man discharged to the reserves. No complaints came, not one.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now are you resolving the social problems associated with the reorganization, and with the reduction of the Armed Forces?

[Makashov] They are being resolved with difficulty. Their urgency in the future is also evident. The district has around 9.5 thousand officer families without apartments. Of them, 2.5 thousand simply have no roof over their heads. The housing problem has become especially exacerbated in the Volga area. There are many military schools

here. There is a high percentage of Volga residents. Others are creating families in these parts, and after finishing service somewhere in the North, in the taiga or desert, they return here to their origins. The problems cannot be solved through the efforts of military builders, although we expect for example in the Ural region alone that we will erect 16 apartment houses this year, with an average 60 apartments in each. With respect to housing, which by law the local authorities are supposed to allocate, they are far in arrears. At times they even delay transfer of the housing area which was constructed on a shared basis using Defense Ministry funds. It has been necessary to resort even to Deputy's inquiries...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does a new district mean new cadre problems?

[Makashov] These problems come not only from reorganization of the district. Presently there is a change of generations, if we can call it, occurring everywhere at the command levels. It is thoroughly affecting also the military academic institutions, the organs of the local military administration, and the military departments of universities and institutes. And if you remember that in the Volga-Ural district there are even hundreds of military commissariats, then one can imagine that nature and scope of the cadre work. It is no secret that for a long time officers who did not do well in line units, who were not distinguished by energy and zeal in service, were sent to the military commissariats and the military departments of civilian VUZ', and sometimes even to military schools. But you know, this is not right. For work with students and reserve officer training requires not simply an officer who profoundly knows his military specialty, but a man with a broad political horizon, extensive cultural assets, a sharp mind, special internal attractiveness. And it depends no less on outstanding qualities of employees of military commissariats, the authorized representatives of the Army among the masses, among the people.

Many of our military commissariats and military departments have already undergone renewal. Cadre problems are being actively resolved in the units. Here there are not easy, more than enough friction, as they say. But we must be consistent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The territory on which the district is located is sending large groups of conscripts to the Army and Navy...

[Makashov] Ural and Volga residents in army units and on ships are always happily received. These are reliable reinforcements. Many of our alumni go to border units and submarines.

We pay a lot of attention to patriotic education, the preparation of youth for service, and we are strengthening ties with local party, Soviet, trade union, and komsomol organs, defense society organizations, schools, and trade schools. Recently we have turned over to DOSAAF organizations a great deal of equipment and training weapons, and we are renewing sponsorship ties.

Yesterday I returned from Kazan, where I visited the extremely popular Suvorov military school. I was disappointed to see that the school is poorly equipped with modes of Ground Forces equipment. We decided to correct the situation immediately.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Albert Mikhaylovich, I know that much of your time goes to becoming acquainted with the Volga and Ural region garrisons. How do you manage to combine the duties of commanding general with those of People's Deputy of the USSR?

[Makashov] I am sure not everyone knows what an additional burden is imposed on a man by the title of deputy. I for example have this rule: every Monday I travel without fail to Sverdlovsk. Deputies' reception is from 1600 hours until infinity, figuratively speaking.

I am convinced that our legal system is far from perfect yet. Just one example. In our district, as in others, in the reduction some percentage of senior officers who have not served their 25 years are being discharged to the reserve. As is known, they do not suffer when it comes to their pensions. But they are deprived of certain rights and benefits because they failed to serve the last year or two. I think this is unfair. I made a concrete proposal to the USSR Committee of the Supreme Soviet on matters of defense and security. Strange to say, they did not reply to me, a Deputy. So what can an ordinary war veteran hope for, having lost his strength and health?

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question, Albert Mikhaylovich. Your attitude toward KRASNAYA ZVEZDA?

[Makashov] I fell in love with the "Star" in my cadet years, and still feel the same. I want to see a thorough and expert paper in the publicizing of progressive experience, and a bold, sharp-tongued one in the struggle against shortcomings and the specific carriers of harm.

Problems in Military Assistance to Harvest

18011023 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Sep 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel O. Bedula: "We Do Not Need Help"]

[Text] I recently called Pavlovskaya Station, in Krasnodarskiy Kray. Lieutenant Colonel V. Zgonnikov, commander of the battalion formed in the Volga-Ural Military District, did not hide his satisfaction: Contacts with the local authorities had been laid; the harvest was in full swing, the companies were overfulfilling the plan; the people's earnings were good. Problems? There are none.

I was genuinely happy for Zgonnikov, but at the same time, I thought that such a "no problem" state of affairs for "harvest" battalions was a rarity. There was quite some alarm in the reports coming into the district headquarters from the field.

"Primarily we encounter glaring mismanagement," says Colonel A. Zaykov, covering the work of such groups

from the district political department. It is already apparent that the current harvest, just like the last one, will cost the state a pretty penny.

Col Zaykov, who has already traveled throughout many regions of the country, is dispirited:

"Until recently, 10 battalions were working in Saratov Oblast, from ours as well as from the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, and Odessa military districts. A telegram came from the USSR Ministry of Defense operations group at the height of the harvest. All battalions were ordered redeployed in other oblasts."

Farm managers and local authorities were perplexed and confused. They wondered, where are you helpers going when there are still sunflowers, corn, and sugar beets to harvest? For example, in the Krasnoyarsk region they were so offended that they did not even wish to thank the soldiers for the work they had completed.

Where were they off to in such a hurry? For example, Captain D. Zhvitiashvili's battalion? To Lipetsk Oblast, I find out. So, one subdivision, having completed a 700 kilometer march, arrived at the rayon center, Dolgorukovo. But it turns out that the soldiers had not been expected here.

"We do not need you," they told the motor vehicle drivers in Yelets and Khlevnyy, the rayon centers of Lipetsk Oblast. When the battalion traveled 200 kilometers around the oblast looking in vain for "employers," the command turned to the oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] for explanations. The battalion was accommodated only after this.

It must be said that the various farms met the "virgin land workers" that way in Saratov Oblast, where a fairly good harvest was raised. Could it be that these farms did not need the people, the equipment? And how they were needed! But the zealous managers did not allow themselves the luxury of paying for such expensive labor from the motor vehicle drivers. This was especially true of the debtor farms.

"The kolkhozes [collective farms] plan for heavy freight motor vehicles with trailers," said Lieutenant Colonel V. Chmora, representative of the district motor vehicle service. "Trucks like the KamAZ, which run on diesel fuel. But for the most part, the military units sent GAZ-66 and ZIL-157, gasoline-powered trucks. Usually there is no fuel to spare for them at the farms. And these types of trucks consume a great quantity of gasoline. A GAZ-66 uses 36 liters to cover 100 kilometers, with a cargo capacity of only two metric tons. And complete

no-win situations arise when subdivisions come to the harvest with "Ural" motor vehicles, as did one battalion from the Turkestan Military District.

On the Saratov Oblast farms there was no 93 octane ("Zhiguli gas") gasoline, as required by the "Ural" trucks, therefore, the Turkestan battalion had to fill up the vehicles with 76 octane. And, as Lt Col Chmora concluded, afterwards, these truck engines must simply be written off.

The question arises: Why can't conclusions be drawn from the situations which repeat themselves year after year? Why is such low-productivity equipment sent to the harvest with such enviable regularity? Could it be that the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, with the usual arm-twisting methods, plans on forcing the farms to take battalions with any equipment, and pay cold, hard cash for their labor (which in general is what they have been managing to do)?

I frequently observe a familiar picture of railroad rolling stock rushing past the Kuybyshev station with hundreds of motor vehicles and shelters for the soldiers. Sometimes they rush toward each other. This year, rolling stock went to Krasnoyarskiy and Krasnodarskiy krais from the Volga-Ural district. Battalions came to us from the Far Eastern and Transbaykal districts. Says Colonel A. Zaykov, "The impression is created that we are not gathering the harvest, but working out some sort of school problem on the transfer of motorized troops over large distances."

It must be said that isolating battalions from "their" districts creates a multitude of problems; the problem of material supply provision makes itself felt immediately. Rather than relying on the local agricultural equipment, the district's motor vehicle service recently began to collect long-haul train cars and spare parts for their own battalions.

Another situation also repeats itself from year to year. The battalions which are mobilized within 4-5 days, as quickly as firemen, then sit on the farms for weeks on end, "escorting" the cargo.

Yes, today, while we are talking about the restructuring of our entire economy, it is necessary to change the tactics, strategy and attitude to the virgin lands. What do the officers propose, the ones who have participated in the harvest for some years? Here are only a few suggestions.

First and foremost, grant the farmer the right to choose his assistants for himself. Most likely, they will be from "his own" district, and not some far away land. The rayons and even kolkhozes could then make contracts, which would wean the oblispolkoms away from the temptation to extort spare battalions from the center.

Blackjack Simulators Unavailable
18011004

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 17 September 1989 publishes in its first edition a page 2 article by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Levitskiy entitled, "We Teach Them to Fly the TU-160".

The article notes that a TU-160 Blackjack bomber regiment, despite its need to train personnel for operations in the bomber does not have the necessary trainer in which to do so. The problem of the lack of this key ground system was referred to the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry. However: "Production of the trainer is more expensive than the bomber itself." It has been developed, but its introduction is being delayed.

Complaints on Organization of Ship Repairs

18010880 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 89 Second Edition p 1

[Letters to the Editors: "Two Letters on the Same Subject"]

[Text]

What Is the Price of Repair?

We serve on a nuclear-powered submarine. Our crew performed all its tasks successfully. It is hardly worth bringing ourselves to the newspaper's attention except for the extraordinary circumstances in which we and our missile-carrying submarine found ourselves.

Here is the problem. An immediate order came from combined headquarters to the submarine: On 5 January 1989 the crew must leave base and deliver the ship to the plant for repairs.

The tactical problem came on the evening of 2 January. This meant that within 2 days we were to clear out, give up our housing, and send our families to a new residence. After all, this repair was going to take many, many months...

After an extended passage, we arrived at the bay where the ship repair plant is located. We docked and are to this day still in some inexplicable waiting period. It turns out that at the present time, there is no opportunity to take ships in for repair.

Then what was all the fuss about? After all, our ship could have continued to perform the assigned tasks successfully without comprehensive repairs and with even greater efficiency if the current repair had been done at the permanent base where it would have cost 15-20 times less. And what troubles would the crew have been spared?

We stand at the base from which we must go to the unit into which we will finally be "merged." It is approximately a 2-hour bus ride there. At the unit they tell us that there is no order for our inclusion there and that they have no intention of resolving all our problems.

We have been living for almost a month on a ship with an atomic power generator, even though at the base it is not recommended that long periods of time be spent on it. Quarters are not even promised, since we are here temporarily. How temporary are we when, judging by other crews' experience, it is known that the given undertaking is usually extraordinarily drawn out. And where will the submarine personnel with families and small children live? On this score, our chiefs have a bureaucratic-stagnation response: Seek and rent private apartments; exchange the ones remaining at your old garrison.

The question arises, what kind of approach to people is this?

[signed] Captain 2nd Rank S. Styupan, combat unit commander. Captain-Lieutenant R. Fartdinov, secretary of the ship's party organization]

An "Alien" Crew

The chronicle of events is as follows. On 20 August of last year it was announced to our ship's crew that we were being temporarily reassigned to another combined unit. After the ship, the personal files of the officers and warrant officers were sent to the mainland, as well as the communists' record cards. A month later we transferred to the dock of the ship repair plant under the deployment of the command of another unit. Of course, not everyone understood why it was necessary to complete such a complicated "chess" maneuver when there is an analogous ship repair plant at the site of our permanent station. But we are military people...

And only in February of this year did we learn, not without surprise, that we had spent 3 months at the plant mooring without any known reason. The appropriate directive from the fleet commander appeared only on 29 December 1988. And all told, 6 months had already passed since we had left home base, but no one could say when the repair would begin.

Incidentally one must think that it is all the same to the ship, made of hard metal, at which mooring it stands. But there is a problem with the crew. As it is, sailors see their home ports infrequently, and in the given case, even the families were left at odds on the shore. The question arises, to what end? Perhaps those who so heartlessly and thoughtlessly plan our fates can answer us?... Frankly speaking, we doubt it. They are too far removed from the problems of personnel in service afloat.

Nor is the political department in any condition to defend our social rights. When we raised the issue of providing us with housing, Captain 2nd rank R. Rayanov replied tersely, "Your unit is not being taken into consideration in the allocation of the housing fund..." Nor in the aforementioned political organs was it considered necessary to work out in detail the situation which has come about.

But time and confusion do their work. Unhealthy tendencies have been noted in a formerly solid crew, by all indications, a "strong" one. There have appeared officers who wish to be discharged into the reserves because of family disorders. For the same reason, the warrant officers do not wish to continue serving on the ship. Moreover, families are being destroyed. True, individual "undisciplined wives" nevertheless gave it all up and came to the garrison, but it is better not to describe their ordeals. Anyone who does not know the life of navy families would not believe it for a minute...

[signed] Captain 3rd Rank V. Kolokolov, and all the ship's communists

From the Editors

This is not the first time letters of similar content have come to the editorial board, specifically from the Pacific Fleet. They bear witness that this is not some sort of extraordinary case, but probably a system which has come into being, a deep-rooted practice. The facts are persuasive that previous publications on this subject, as they say, did not change anything; everything has remained as it was... So perhaps this time there is cause for the navy leadership to get involved in solving this urgent problem?

Pacific Fleet Commander's Press Conference

18011026 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[Captain 2nd Rank V. Dyubkin, Pacific Fleet: "An Act of Trust".]

[Text] Vladivostok 11 July. [TASS] In the Northwestern portion of the Sea of Japan tactical exercises of the Pacific Fleet have begun. Its directions correspond fully to the defensive doctrine of the USSR. 20 ships, including 3 nuclear submarines, 37 Fleet airplanes and helicopters, 9 auxiliary ships, and approximately 10 thousand people are involved in the exercise. It is led by Commander of the Fleet G.A. Khvatov.

For the first time at an exercise of the Pacific Fleet representatives of the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia are present as military observers. This fact—is one more testimony to the new political thinking, broad glasnost and openness of the policies of the Soviet state. The course of the exercise is being covered by journalists from the Soviet Union as well as foreign journalists from Australia, England, the KPR, the USA, Thailand, the ChSSR [Czechoslovakia], and Japan, accredited to the Headquarters of the Soviet Fleet.

On the eve of the deployment of forces participating in the Pacific Fleet exercise a press conference, in which Fleet Commander Admiral G. Khvatov took part, was held for journalists and foreign military observers.

[Robert Karniol [transliteration] (Thailand):] I know that the Soviet Navy possesses two aircraft carriers. Were they to be used in the current exercises, would the tactics be changed?

[Answer] It is not necessary to confuse aircraft carriers and those two aircraft carrying ships, which are in fact in the fleet. They are also intended for the fulfillment of defensive missions.

[Akiro Komoto (Japan):] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has declared a reduction of the USSR Armed Forces in connection with which even now a defensive reorganization of the structure of the fleet is going on. How will this in fact influence life in the fleet?

[Answer] The fleet already possesses ships of a defensive character—anti-submarine and mine warfare [ships].

[ChSSR Television:] What is the number of exercises conducted by the Pacific Fleet in a year?

[Answer] We conduct three to four exercises per year in areas proximate to the shores of Kamchatka and Primorya.

[NHK Television Broadcasting Agency (Japan):] How do you plan to combat strikes by conventional weapons, for example the "Tomahawk"? What is your view of the US Navy's new naval doctrine?

[Answer] To combat "Tomahawk" strikes we are developing operations as in the case of combatting air attack, that is, by the use of missile and artillery weapons and interceptor aircraft.

US naval doctrine has an aggressive character. It envisages forward basing, also the presence of two US fleets in direct proximity to our shores concerns us.

Military-to-Civil Industrial Conversion Discussed

18160012b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 89 pp 30-40

[Article by Ye. Butusov: "Conversion: Conceptual and Practical Aspects (Theses)"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Bugrov, doctor of economic sciences; sector chief, IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences, presented these theses in March 1989 at a Soviet-British symposium organized by the Russell Foundation and the Economics Commission of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace on problems of conversion

1. In the '80's there was increased attention and interest in sociopolitical circles of many countries in problems of conversion, i. e., the conversion of the military economy to peaceful pursuits. This new mood reflects the first successes and new prospects for real disarmament especially in connection with the Soviet-American treaty eliminating medium- and short-range missiles, progress in negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, the possibility of completing a convention eliminating chemical weapons, and the commencement of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. The Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament measures are of major significance. The Soviet armed forces are being reduced by 500,000 men or by 12 percent, the Soviet military budget is being reduced by 14.2 percent, and the production of arms and military equipment is being cut by 19.5 percent. Substantial unilateral armed forces reduction measures are also being taken by other Warsaw Treaty countries. These positive changes in the area of disarmament have made research, development and practical recommendations on conversion an urgent topic at both the national and international level. In the theses on these questions, the approaches and evaluations are formulated as an invitation to take part in the discussion in the interest of the in depth study of this problem in the Soviet Union and of expanding knowledge and experience in an area that affects the vital interests of the world community.

2. Conversion is primarily understood to mean the conversion of military production to the production of nonmilitary products. Many practical problems relating to the conversion of material and labor resources from military to civilian use arise and require resolution specifically in the production sphere. It is at the same time also appropriate to interpret conversion more broadly as an aggregate of measures for the peaceful restructuring of other elements of the national economy connected with military activity. Reductions in the armed forces and their T/O&E weapons [*shtatnoye vooruzheniye*]; cutbacks in military research and development; closures of military bases, facilities, and institutions; the curtailment of military training activity, etc.,

also liberate resources and allow them to be used productively in the conversion process. Such an interpretation of conversion includes using in the national economy military equipment that has been removed from operational status as a result of multilateral and unilateral disarmament measures. The multitude of areas of conversion and the aggregate of levers and consequences require the combination of macro- and microeconomic approaches to the development and implementation of measures for converting resources to civilian use. **Conversion can be characterized as the implementation of a properly planned complex of financial, economic, organizational, technical, and other measures for the orderly conversion of military production and other military activity to nonmilitary pursuits in the course of disarmament and as the process of the corresponding change in proportions of distribution of financial, human, and material resources between civilian and military spheres.**MDNM/.

3. Works by Soviet and foreign research centers and UN materials present valid arguments supporting the conclusion that the prolonged, large-scale diversion of resources for military preparations has a depressing rather than stimulating impact on socioeconomic development which is manifested in the slowdown of economic growth rates, in the intensification of financial problems, in the increasing complexity of the employment and unemployment situation, in the deformation of scientific-technological progress, in the decline of the living standard, and in mounting difficulties in other directions. This conclusion is based on theoretical arguments of scientists belonging to different schools and on vast bodies of empirical data. Conversion ensures the stage-by-stage elimination of the economic burden of military preparations and the normalization of the conditions of functioning of the national economy through the elimination of the disproportions and deformations generated by militarization and the release of enormous additional resources required to combat economic backwardness and poverty. This will mean the elimination of losses that are many times greater than all losses throughout the world due to earthquakes, floods, drought, typhoons, and other natural disasters. Conversion thus acts as a mechanism that eliminates the complex of negative socioeconomic consequences of the arms race.

4. The closer interrelationship between the military and civilian sectors of the economy, which is largely manifested in the development of the former to the detriment of the latter, attaches exceptional importance to the distribution of resources between two sectors under concrete national conditions. The correlation of military and civilian spending is among the most important national economic proportions. It does not occur spontaneously, but is the direct result of decisions made by the state. The choice between the civilian and military use of resources must be made by practically all countries regardless of their social system, their initiative, or their responsive role in military preparations. In real life

the "action-counteraction" schema in the military area leads to the existence of greater resource difficulties for a country or coalition of countries with the relatively lesser general economic potential. These countries can reduce the economic burden of their military efforts only if they are guided by a military doctrine demanding the maintenance of their armed forces and arms at a level that is rationally sufficient for their defense.

5. The correlation of the scale of civilian and military use of resources at the national level is of a concretely historical nature. It changes sharply in peacetime and wartime. This proportion is also mobile under peacetime conditions. It forms under the influence of the balance of power in the world arena. It reflects the dynamics of the arms race and the effectiveness of efforts to limit and curb arms. From the standpoint of strengthening international security and the requirement for resources for resolving the problems of specific countries and global problems, the current level of world military spending and of national military spending should be recognized as excessive in most cases. The lowering of this level requires the reduction of military efforts on the basis of their rational sufficiency. Conversion essentially means that activity in the civilian sphere expands as a result of the narrowing of the military sector of the economy and the establishment of new proportions on a national and global scale that are in the interests of the people.

6. Conversion requires the solution of an intricate complex of economic, technological, personnel, and other problems. However, the large-scale practical realization of such activity cannot begin before political decisions have been reached on multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral disarmament measures. The complex of measures to convert resources from the military to the civilian sphere cannot be separated from disarmament. This reflects the profound interconnection of its political and economic aspects. The implementation of conversion measures is possible only as a consequence and continuation of arms reduction decisions in the socioeconomic sphere. For all their importance, models (concrete models) of conversion cannot take the place of such decisions. Conversion is therefore primarily a political problem. It is inseparable from the scale and features of decisions preceding it regarding arms reduction and measures to implement them.

7. Even though the economic content of conversion can be the subject of independent study, the quite widespread concept of "economic conversion" does not exhaust, but rather narrows the question primarily because of the loss of the political aspect associated with disarmament. Conversion is rightly viewed as the economic and social component of disarmament, as the mechanism of transition from an arms economy to a disarmament economy. Conversion is the continuation and development of the arms reduction process. It is the extension of this process to the economic and social sphere. Arms reduction and conversion are internally unified and comprise an intricate complex of political, economic, social, technological, organizational, and

other problems and form a system of interrelations, the analysis of which is important on a theoretical and practical plane.

8. The conversion conception in all its aspects at the end of the twentieth century must necessarily be based on the reality of the interconnectedness and wholeness of the modern world. Conversion, as part of the disarmament process, relates to the class of global problems that affect the interests of all mankind and that presuppose the internationalization of efforts to solve them. Even though conversion must correspond to the needs of national development, it cannot remain outside the influence of economic, energy, ecological, informational, demographic, and other factors that have gone beyond national boundaries and that have become acute global problems of modern time. Under these conditions, mankind's common values receive higher and higher priority for conversion plans, models, and practice, while activity to convert resources to peaceful uses becomes an expanding area of international cooperation. Conversion measures are not sufficiently coordinated in various countries: they must be reciprocally coordinated. Their common objective must be to increase the contribution to the solution of the global problems confronting mankind, to the preservation of civilization, and to the improvement of the quality of life on earth.

9. Other common human aspects of conversion are also important. Regardless of the social system and level of development of the countries participating in disarmament, the conversion that is carried out inside them is an intricate complex of economic and social problems connected with the choice of alternative competitive products, with the reorganization of production, with investment measures, with cooperative relations, with the retraining and relocation of personnel, and with other activity of an administrative and technical nature. The planning of conversion and the transition to the production of new products or other civilian activity can take several years under all social conditions. The inevitability of such difficulties and the necessity of overcoming them make this a universal problem. Scientific research and historical experience show that such communality is manifested, on the one hand, in the basic practicability of conversion in socialist, capitalist, and developing countries and in the absence of insurmountable economic or technical obstacles to its realization in all situations after the political decisions have been made. The reality of the socioeconomic gain in all countries, especially in the medium and long haul, resulting from the conversion of resources from military to civilian use, is the other aspect of this communality.

10. When examining the problems of conversion, it is important to make a realistic appraisal of the potential and prospects of disarmament and to take the disarmament concept based on the experience of the last few decades as the foundation. Its essence is that arms reduction is not a one-time action, but is a long-term stage-by-stage process, the ultimate aim of which is

general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The program advanced by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986 for a nuclear-free world is designed to be implemented in stages up until the end of the present century. Proposals on armed forces and arms reduction in Europe that were approved in May 1988 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty nations in Budapest are intended to be implemented gradually. Thus, with the view of disarmament as a long-term, stage-by-stage process, the conversion of resources to nonmilitary uses has proven to be a complex of measures and actions that is deconcentrated over time. In real terms, there is a vision of a "drawn-out" conversion process which cannot but favor its preparation and practical implementation. The warnings of a number of Western researchers about the dangers of "rapid conversion" ignore the prospects for real disarmament.

11. Only in the planning stage can activity in the area of conversion precede international legal actions or unilateral measures to reduce arms. These actions and measures constitute the prerequisite and the condition to the conversion of resources from military to civilian uses. Such a sequence dictates the necessity of coordinating conversion measures, their volume, their rates, and their time with partial disarmament. The conceptual study and planning of conversion measures in connection with large-scale reduction of both strategic offensive weapons and armed forces and conventional arms, and also in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons are also increasingly placed on the agenda. National approaches and decisions²⁰ regarding this range of questions are of paramount importance. ²⁰They form the basic framework and conditions of elaboration of conversion measures at the level of enterprises and branches on a regional and local scale.

12. The role of conversion goes beyond the framework of promoting the development of the productive forces and the well-being of peoples. It becomes an important link in the actual disarmament process from the standpoint of its irreversibility. The more extensive arms reduction based on international agreements, the more probable it is that they will include provisions that envisage the curtailment of the corresponding military production and that guarantee its nonresumption. Such contractual obligations directly open the way to the conversion of resources to civilian use. Conversion measures become an additional obstacle to attempts to compensate the overlapping of certain directions in the arms race by the development of other directions in the race. If conversion were carried out under international control where necessary, the result would be the creation of resource constraints that would act as an economic guarantee of the observance of the letter and spirit of arms reduction agreements. This role of conversion would intensify in connection with the expanded possibilities for the realistic comparison of the military spending of various countries. Conversion can thus play an active part in

ensuring the effectiveness of disarmament. The inclusion of special provisions relating to the peaceful use of liberated resources in agreements on disarmament measures would work in this direction.

13. Conversion also has a direct bearing on disarmament in the sense that conceptual clarity on the possibility of converting resources to peaceful uses and the demonstrable readiness to carry out effective practical work in this direction eliminate economic prejudices against disarmament. This makes it possible to win over those who have been involved in military preparations, not having the choice of employment and other sources of income, and to frustrate attempts by militaristic forces to use socioeconomic arguments to justify the arms race.

14. The study of conversion problems helps us to gain a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between disarmament and development. The road from the reduction of armed forces and arms to the practical facilitation of the solution of development problems confronting all mankind runs through conversion. Since it is a mode of actual conversion of resources liberated from the military sphere for peaceful uses, it materializes the "disarmament for development" principle and transforms disarmament into a factor of national and global development. Conversion problems occupied a significant place in the work of the International Conference on Disarmament and Development which was held in New York in August-September 1987. They were the subject of materials presented at the conference. They were raised in the statements of official representatives and became part of the concluding document that was consensually approved by the conference. The concluding document, which emphasized the necessity of strengthening the central role of the UN in the area of disarmament and development, calls for including in that organization's programs measures oriented toward the study of conversion problems, the conceptualization of research and development results in this area, and the diffusion of the experience of such activity under concrete national conditions. The Soviet scientific community is satisfied with the conference's conclusion that the UN, as written in the concluding document, "must assist the international exchange of opinions and experience in the area of conversion."

15. Modern scientific ideas reveal the superficiality of the approach to evaluating the potential and consequences of conversion that was typical of publications and even official documents in the USSR and other countries in the '60's and '70's and that reduced to the comparison of the "simplicity and ease" of its realization under socialism with the "particular" difficulty of converting resources to peaceful uses in capitalist countries. This approach was not based on arguments that were convincing to any degree; scientific analysis gave way to simplistic propagandistic interests. For all the importance of careful evaluations of the specifics of conversion in countries with different social systems, especially with regard to the ways and means that can be used in its practical realization, the common features of this

problem under different social conditions and the common regularities in the economic and social adaptation of enterprises, branches, and the economy as a whole to the new conditions of reduction of arms, military spending, and the corresponding state orders, are nevertheless of paramount importance.

16. The real potential for conversion is confirmed by the experience of the USSR, USA, Great Britain, and other countries in converting their economies to a peacetime footing at the end of World War II. The success of this mass conversion of resources from the military to the civilian sphere is common knowledge. Such maneuvering with resources, even though it was facilitated by "deferred demand" for civilian goods in a number of countries, confirms the groundlessness of militaristic circles' claims of the inevitability of drastically negative socioeconomic consequences of disarmament. Of course, we cannot draw a direct analogy between conversion in our time and conversion following World War II, especially when we consider the ever more highly specialized character of modern military production and the attendant difficulty of converting it to civilian production, and also the change in general socioeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, the postwar experience should not be ignored. It retains its significance in many respects. It is valuable not only in the respect that it helps us to understand the new complexities of conversion in recent decades. This experience is no less important by virtue of the fact that countries belonging to different social systems have simultaneously demonstrated the potential for converting resources from the military to the civilian sphere in a short time and on a large scale. Against this background, conversion activity corresponding to partial disarmament measures that are now being negotiated or that are scheduled for negotiation seems to be less intensive and on a smaller scale. Historical criteria help us to make a realistic appraisal of the volume and solvability of conversion problems under present conditions. This does not eliminate the economic and psychological newness of the problems of modern conversion that is associated with the dismantling of a military machine created not during a war but in peacetime.

17. Conclusions concerning the basic, practical practicability of conversion in all countries regardless of the social system and level of development help us to analyze in greater depth the potential not only for inhibiting the militarization of the capitalist economy but for its large-scale demilitarization as well. Realism in the evaluation of capitalism's ability to adapt economically to the conditions of progressive disarmament helps to promote the development of events in this direction. Research on conversion shows that resistance to the demilitarization process is primarily and chiefly associated with the role of political rather than economic factors.

18. Current discussions of conversion embrace not only its theoretical aspects but also the question of how to practically convert resources to civilian uses and how to

prepare to carry out conversion measures in order to avert or neutralize socioeconomic difficulties in the disarmament process. This is essentially the discussion of the conversion mechanism as regards the conditions at the end of the present century. The debates are illustrative from the standpoint of selection of directions of preparatory activity, of determining the role and responsibility of state, trade union, and other organizations in the formulation and implementation of conversion measures at the national, regional, and local level, and of identifying the ways and means that could ensure the effectiveness of converting resources to peaceful uses. The features of conversion in its national and international aspect become quite clearly discernible in the course of the search for constructive ideas.

19. The planning of conversion in the '80's has become one of the central topics of national and international discussion of the conversion of the economy from a military to peaceful orientation. Soviet scientists essentially share a common position with their colleagues in other countries regarding the necessity and practicability of planning such conversion of resources with regard to specific national conditions. The formulation of conversion plans after decades of the arms race is by no means simple. This is a big problem that will require considerable scientific and practical efforts. In addition to being oriented toward facilitating the solution of acute national problems, such plans must also take global interests and needs into account. If countries were to draft conversion plans in good time, this would be evidence of their interest in fruitful disarmament negotiations and their preparedness for real arms reduction measures. The world community has properly evaluated the Soviet Union's proposal that every country prepare its own national conversion plan and the intention of the USSR to make a comprehensive study of conversion and of the preparation of the appropriate plans at the national and regional levels. The interest of the Soviet scientific community and public in the exhaustive report published in Sweden on the possibilities and avenues of conversion in that country is consequently understandable.

20. The planning of conversion is above all a substantiated choice of alternative civilian products to the production of which various military enterprises could be converted—a choice that ensures the most feasible use of the equipment and experience of these enterprises. It also entails the replacement of production equipment on one or another scale, change of technological processes, and the restructuring of management systems and cooperative ties. Within the framework of models of conversion of enterprises, their groups, and even branches in connection with future arms reduction, there is need for calculations and substantiations to ensure the profitability of new production based on the restructuring of military enterprises to the same degree. Such conversion models are the economics of disarmament in action especially because they are openly compared and the choice favors the most rational and effective use of

resources that are liberated from the military sphere. Naturally, the ability of converted enterprises to operate according to the criteria of the civilian market, i. e., to minimize production costs, to guarantee production schedules and the quality and competitiveness of new products in this market, is of decisive importance here. Also involved here is the study of the complex of technical questions relating to the reorganization of production, management decisions, and marketing strategy, and, what is especially important, measures to ensure employment in the civilian sector to persons released from the military sphere, including the retraining of personnel. There also arise other problems that require technical and economic study and consideration of social factors. Only in this way can it really be shown that disarmament is an economically substantiated alternative.

21. Preparations for the orderly execution of conversion measures can be hindered by the underestimation of the role of the state in this process. It should not be reduced beforehand only to intervention in certain extreme instances. The debates on conversion have brought forth convincing arguments in favor of the active role of the state in various stages of planning and executing the conversion of resources from the military to the civilian sphere under different national conditions associated with the prevention or neutralization of possible negative consequences of conversion. This role essentially does not presuppose going beyond the traditional forms and levers of state regulation of economic activity based on concrete social relations. There is also justification for the premise that the participation of the state in conversion activity must be commensurate with the level and duration of its efforts in the sphere of military preparations and their economic support.

22. Views of such an active role of the state do not contradict the principle of coordination of efforts in the formulation and implementation of conversion measures which presupposes participation in such activity side by side with central and local state organs of the administration of converted enterprises as well as of the trade unions. Attention is merited in this connection by a number of countries' proposals to establish national conversion councils staffed by representatives of key ministries, trade union associations, the trade and industry community, and regional and local authorities. It would appear that scientists should participate in such councils or other coordinating bodies that are vested with the appropriate powers and that form the central element in the conversion mechanism because this would ensure the participation of research institutions in this activity, many aspects of which await scientific research and recommendations. The restructuring of the economy along peaceful lines requires the active effort of all interested social groups. The coordination of their efforts is an important condition to the successful preparation and realization of conversion measures.

23. Unfortunately, many countries deny the need for official conversion measures on the grounds that they are

"premature" and block proposed legislative and other measures that would outline the contours of activity to convert a military economy to a civilian economy, that would define the responsibility and functions of state bodies, the private sector, and trade unions in planning and executing conversion measures. The lag in this area is quite conspicuous against the background of the growing number of local initiatives in the area of conversion. The plan for converting enterprises belonging to Lucas Aerospace (Great Britain)—a plan that was devised by the shop stewards of this military concern and that envisages conversion to more than 100 types of nonmilitary products—is world-renowned. In a number of countries, trade unions that reflect the mood of the working people have become widely involved in the formulation of plans for the conversion of military enterprises to civilian production. The International Association of Machine Building and Aerospace Industry Workers (USA), for example, has been active in this regard. However such activity in the interest of conversion has still not led to state actions that promote local initiatives and their coordination on the basis of national plans and programs.

The Soviet and foreign community is expressing the opinion that the discussion of these questions could be supplemented by discussion of a variant of the transfer of resources liberated as a result of disarmament to the disposal of national bodies responsible for conversion, with the appropriate provisions (conversion funds) being instituted in state budgets.

24. The nature and scale of measures necessary to prevent or eliminate the economic and social difficulties that may arise as a result of the reduction of armed forces and arms with the corresponding reduction of military spending are connected with state activity in the area of conversion. The selection and execution of such compensatory measures are one of the important aspects of the conversion of resources to peaceful uses. The need for such measures is essentially universal even though concrete forms for promoting conversion must necessarily reflect the socioeconomic conditions of a given country.

25. Socialist countries can actively use the mechanism for managing production and for developing the social sphere on the basis of state national economic plans to promote conversion and to minimize the difficulties associated with it. Compensatory measures can be built into this mechanism. This means that state plans must be adjusted in connection with the possibility of restructuring military production capacities into civilian production capacities. Practical activity in this direction presupposes conceptual clarity regarding the concrete tasks of development of the civilian economy that can be resolved most effectively with the aid of conversion. This is the basis of investment, technological, organizational and other resource conversion measures,

including benefits for workers and employees of converted enterprises during their reorganization and manpower retraining programs. There is also need for corresponding budget decisions since the saving on military spending that results from armed forces and arms reduction is the source of financing of these measures.

26. Nor can conversion be a self-regulating process in the capitalist countries. Of course, it would be facilitated by a high degree of diversification of production in companies filling state military orders that have the experience of converting to the production of civilian goods. For many companies, this is a normal process of restructuring of the work in a situation of structural change under the conditions of change in the demand for products when it ceases to be competitive in the national or international market. The adaptation of production to change has become a constant necessity under the influence of modern technology and therefore conversion measures can frequently be regarded as particular cases of such adaptation. Nevertheless, the scale and consequences of the conversion process go beyond the framework of conventional structural changes in the economy. Market mechanisms are capable of providing only a partial solution to the problems that are connected with the liberation of resources from the military sphere. The experience of state intervention in the economy and of using various regulatory measures can be called upon to help.

27. The possibility for formulating compensatory measures along the lines of regulating the structure of state demand for goods and services is considerable. The proportion of division of demand between military and civilian components can be changed in favor of increasing spending on nonmilitary goods and services. Increased state financing of socioeconomic programs would be an effective means of transforming state demand without reducing the overall volume of state purchases of goods and services. It is equally obvious that the reduction of state demand, if it proved to be inevitable, could be compensated by the growth of the population's effective demand by lowering taxes. The experience of a number of countries in executing manpower training and retraining programs could also be useful.

28. It is important to emphasize that the need for compensatory measures should not be absolutized. The formulation and approval of measures for promoting conversion must not be used as a kind of "preliminary condition" to political decisions in the actual disarmament area. The sequence of measures is essentially a problem that is easily solvable on the basis of the principle of parallel efforts. Negotiations on specific disarmament measures can be combined with the planning and preparation of appropriate conversion measures to implement agreements on real disarmament at a minimum cost and with maximum socioeconomic benefit.

29. Among the various problems that relate to conversion, its connection with the employment of the able-bodied population occupies a key place. The need for such conversion of resources used in the military sphere to civilian projects, as would at least not raise unemployment, would be accompanied by the creation of new jobs to compensate the reduction of the armed forces or the work force in military production is obvious. Analysis of the possibilities and conditions of absorption of liberated labor resources by the civilian sphere, the difficulties that arise in the process, and the ways of overcoming them therefore acquires special importance. This is an area of not only theoretical appraisals but also of applied research capable of dispelling still persisting views of employment as the "first victim" of disarmament. Works by Soviet researchers do not downplay the difficulty of converting labor resources from military to peaceful uses and continue to clearly formulate the conclusion that it is fundamentally and practically possible to preserve and increase employment when the economy is converted to peaceful pursuits. It can be said that this approach is consistent with many foreign assessments and calculations of the impact of arms reduction and conversion on the labor market.

30. There is broad agreement between the positions advocated in Soviet scholarly discussions and publications and the evaluations of the International Labor Organization on the relationship between conversion and employment and unemployment. The following evaluations and conclusions coincide or nearly coincide:

- Even without the adoption of measures that compensate the reduction of military orders, the conversion of the military industry would not cause mass unemployment in any country that is a major producer of arms and military equipment.

- The occupational makeup of the work force in military production in principle permits their conversion to the civilian sector with relative ease.²⁰ The aviation industry, communications industry, ground transport industry, shipbuilding industry, and a number of other branches require workers in similar occupations to produce similar products for the military and the civilian market. However, even with the most favorable business conditions, not all production workers can be employed in the civilian sector without retraining. The retraining period is usually less than 3 months.

- It would be more difficult—although not always—to find employment for scientific, engineering-technical, and administrative personnel that are released with the conversion to civilian production. In a number of cases, this would take longer to retrain them and to reorient them toward civilian projects.

- In the long run, the economy of various countries would benefit from the narrowing of the military sector because the same volume of investment means more jobs in the civilian sector than in the military

sector and because the release of personnel from the military research and development sphere would lead to significant improvements in the social sphere.

- The effectiveness of the conversion process, especially with respect to the creation of new jobs in the civilian sector, does not originate automatically, but presupposes the necessity of compensatory measures, the nature and volume of which are directly connected to the general economic conditions in a given country.

31. The first data on the anticipated saving of resources and the potential for their nonmilitary use in connection with such an important real, disarmament measure as the Soviet-American treaty eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles have been published in the USSR and have generated interest. It is illustrative that in the discussion of the treaty in the legislative bodies of the two countries, questions relating to conversion were actively raised in connection with its ratification. It is natural to expect more detailed information on the various socioeconomic consequences of the execution of this treaty. The main consideration here is not the scale of conversion and the benefits associated with it, but is the acquisition and assessment of the albeit limited experience of transferring resources from the military to the civilian sector under present conditions. The problems connected with conversion and the ways of solving them await public discussion. The expansion of glasnost in this area would promote disarmament and the development of an economically effective mechanism for converting resources to civilian projects. Regardless of any manner of international inspection agreements relating to conversion, the very nature of these measures and their purpose of securing the peaceful use of resources liberated from the military sphere requires openness and an atmosphere of glasnost for activity in this area.

32. The Soviet scientific community greeted with satisfaction the officially proclaimed readiness of the USSR:

- to draft and submit its internal conversion plan within the framework of the economic reform;
- to draft a plan for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises as an experiment in 1989;
- to publish its experience in finding jobs for military industry specialists and in using its plant and equipment in civilian production.

The Soviet scientific community is oriented toward active participation in such efforts. It supports M. S. Gorbachev's proposal to order a group of scientists to analyze conversion problems in depth in general and in respect of individual countries and regions and to prepare a report on this subject for the UN Secretary General.

33. Scientific research and recommendations on conversion and the economic, technological, and other aspects of its planning and implementation presuppose the need

to expand the international cooperation of scientists participating in such research. The first Soviet-American symposium on the conversion of the military economy into a civilian economy, which was held in Moscow in 1984, showed the feasibility of further international exchange of knowledge and experience in this area. Intensifying their research on this problem, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of Peace, and other research centers of the USSR Academy of Sciences, are prepared to develop such cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis in the interest of promoting disarmament, conversion, and development.

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Problems of Defining, Analyzing Nature of Conversion

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[Article by A. Kireyev, candidate of economic sciences, in the column: "Perestroyka—Test by Deed": "Conversion to Economic Accountability"; first paragraph is OGONEK introduction]

[Text] For a long time economic phenomena were known to us only in theory. Inflation, budget deficits, and a national debt were attributes of "their" economy. They became "ours" only recently. We must add to this very incomplete list the word "conversion"—a term still not familiar to all of us. In its broadest sense it signifies the process of reorienting society's creative forces involved with the country's defense effort toward the realization of peaceful purposes. Conversion presupposes effecting changes in the military, political, economic, and ideological sectors as they relate to demilitarization of all aspects of social life.

The problem of conversion in all its poignancy was presented at the Congress of People's Deputies. The delegates saw conversion of a portion of the military potential to peaceful purposes as one of a small number of realistic ways to bring the country out of the highly critical economic situation. Blatant socio-economic contradictions that have existed for years are forcing us to adopt extraordinary measures. It is high time that the state take action to compensate the handicapped and the elderly, who are receiving miserably small pensions. Tomorrow they will no longer need this money. The state must act now to provide goods to the half-empty consumer market, since people are no longer willing to accept promises and "plans to the year 2000."

Conversion is one of the few realistic possibilities of increasing the availability of goods today, something which would provide at least a partial balance in the devastated market. However, to bring this about it is necessary to acquire a clear understanding of the nature

of conversion, the kind of planning required for its realization, and the purposes to which the released potential is to be put.

To supply answers to the above questions, we must know as a minimum the scale of our defense potential, the portion of the latter we can sacrifice without jeopardizing the country's defensive capability, and the kinds of socio-economic problems this will be capable of resolving.

In spite of glasnost, which has finally entered this delicate sector at great pains, it is still very difficult to provide exact answers. We have residual effects of the past, whereby the information necessary for intelligent analysis was withheld not only from enemies, but also from our own researchers. What do we know now?

We know that Soviet military expenditures for 1989 amount to 77.3 billion rubles or about 9 percent of the gross national product. This is substantially greater than the corresponding amount spent by all the capitalist countries that are leaders in the military sense. For the next two years, reduction in defense expenditures relative to the five-year plan are expected to result in a savings of almost 30 billion rubles.

We know that the manpower level of the Soviet Armed Forces as of 1 January 1989 is 4,258,000 men. The unilateral reduction will lower the total strength to approximately 3,760,000 men by the end of 1990.

We know that a program of production and development of new consumer goods by the defense industry for the 1989-1995 period has been devised. This program calls for tooling for the production of more than 140 types of domestic appliances.

Are the above data sufficient to make an adequate analysis of the conversion problem? Scientists do not know the scale and structure of Soviet military production. The announced reduction of 19.5 percent in production of armaments and combat materiel immediately raises the question of the particular sum from which this amount is being taken. If this is a question of a reduction in output (or purchases) of combat equipment in the amount of one-fifth, then we are speaking of a large-scale conversion of military-industrial potential.

There has been no public announcement of a definite plan setting forth the manner of utilizing the combat equipment, for which a sum of one billion in people's monies would not begin to cover the cost. Finally, we still do not know the age and professional structure of the 12-percent strength reduction, and it is virtually impossible to predict how this reduction will affect the labor market and to what extent the social guarantees are backed up materially for those released from the Army.

Thus, the conversion process under way consists of three major aspects. First, there is the cessation or redirection

of military production effort. Second, there is the reduction in stockpiled armaments. Finally, there is reemployment and retraining of people discharged from the Armed Forces or from military enterprises.

Relative to Soviet military production, judging from the weight of the costs of acquisition of armaments and equipment, the NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design work] of a military nature, and military construction, which in 1989 comprises about three-fourths of all military expenditures, the amounts are more than considerable. Information published in the Soviet press indicates that the purely military expenditures are augmented by outwardly civilian ministries. In this connection, it is paradoxical that civilian production and consumer goods counted in the output of the Ministry of the Aircraft Industry amount to 35.8 percent, while by 1990 it is planned to increase their share to 41 percent. While civilian production of shipbuilders accounts for 42 percent of the sector's output, for next year it is planned to increase it to half of total output.

This means that in reality there is a strong trend toward militarization of civilian production sectors, which are returning to their initial functions as conversion is set into motion. However, on the other hand, under the conditions of many years' standing whereby the state did not spare any expense for the military, making available to the military sector the best the country had to offer—personnel, raw materials, technology—this sector made a substantial leap forward to leave the rest of the economy a great distant behind.

The following is a characterization of the Soviet military industry by the American researchers L. Brown and W. Chandler, who ordinarily are not prone to complimenting us: "It is ironic that arms production is the sole competitive sector of the Soviet economy. By concentrating its efforts on the production of weapons and combat equipment to the detriment of other industries, the Soviet Union is capable of carrying out military production plans and maintaining quality standards, but it does this at the expense of adversely affecting the mechanism controlling the civilian industries."

At the level of conventional wisdom, such a situation is evaluated by a statement such as: "How is it that we are flying in space, but we cannot make a simple iron for pressing clothes!?" People become familiar with the names of "defense" academicians, laureates and heroes mainly from obituaries. Enormous industrial enterprises that are there for all to see have no signs. Maps do not show "concrete-reinforced roads" (betonki) nor often entire towns.

However, that is often only the tip of the iceberg. The main thing is that the Soviet economy has split into two separate parts. The military part is smaller but possesses the best. The civilian part is larger but must be satisfied with what is left. We are setting ourselves the task of merging with the world economy, but we must first merge our own economy by integrating the two parts into

one whole. Failing this, this whole will continue to drag out a miserable existence. We can do this by means of conversion, which will break down the interdepartmental walls to provide the stagnant civilian industries with material and technological rejuvenation from the military.

It seems that we are beginning to understand this simple truth, which is the basis of the economic development of the entire advanced world. The more than 100 new materials, 240 technological processes, and 130 types of progressive equipment announced as created in the process of building the Energiya - Buran system will be used in shipbuilding, medicine, and other sectors of the economy. It will be fortunate if no secrecy barriers arise when matters progress to the point of employing them in civilian enterprises.

There remains the unanswered question of which goods are to be manufactured in the realignment of military production. This problem is of prime importance, since the struggle against the highly serious financial crisis gripping our economy should be waged primarily in the production area, by increasing the output of goods, not only in the financial area (by reducing state expenditures, subsidies, currency emission, etc.).

The point is that a ruble is not a ruble; it amounts to several kopeks, for it is not backed up by goods in the marketplace. The savings accumulated by the people exceed by five times the reserves of material valuables and goods reserves. Converted currency is said to be hard because its possession is a guarantee of acquiring goods that are in considerably larger supply in the marketplace than money. Hence two types of crises: the crisis of overproduction in their countries and the crisis of underproduction in our country. There can be no real increase in goods production, regardless of how much we reduce expenditures to balance the budget.

This means that the emphasis must be on forced increases in production which would outpace the growth in amount of money available, thus rendering the ruble sounder with every passing year. Conversion can help to increase the growth in goods output, but of which goods?

The West sought an answer to the above question for an excruciatingly long period of time. This was the reason for their building econometric conversion models: to evaluate possible positive and negative consequences of conversion. We gave our answer without hesitating: Force the military enterprises to produce the products that we wish them to produce, not the products they are already set up for by virtue of their equipment, technologies, production experience, and intellectual resources. Here and there in central publications there were interviews with military leaders who spoke of how defense industries were ready to assist civilian industries.

It has come to light that the Minoboronprom [Ministry of the Defense Industry], which instead of the respective ministries already was producing purely civilian items, from motor vehicles to cameras, was additionally tasked

with the development and production of production lines for processing cattle and poultry, the manufacture of ice cream, the making of packaging materials, and the output of equipment for breweries and the soft drink industry—something that is not customary to the ministry's traditional product line. The Minoboronprom will undertake the manufacture of refrigeration equipment, while the design offices of the Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry], which are charged with the development of new airliners, will take on the task of developing machines for the fruit and vegetable industry.

The sad state of the light and food industry is beyond description. The millions in losses to the Soviet economy caused by agricultural spoilage associated with outmoded conditions of storage and processing constitute an extremely heavy burden. In this connection, we will impose an even heavier burden on the next generation if we allow the conversion standards to degrade the few high-technology military production processes to the medium union level, which for a good 10 years has lagged behind the technological level of the industrially advanced nations.

In working for today, we must not forget about the future. The enterprises that created the Buran and Energiya are capable of grinding out metal beds good enough to sleep in for a few nights, of course. However, sooner or later we may wake up to discover to our surprise that many countries that are thought of as emerging—not only the developed world—will already be in the next millennium technologically speaking, while we will remain in our squeaky bed.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that military enterprises should be realigned with full consideration of their pre-conversion product line. Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. The Minaviaprom and the Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] have enough to do in their domains. If they can insure that aircraft will not crash and submarines hopefully will not sink, that is all that we can ask as far as conversion is concerned.

Conversion is applicable where civilian production is organized as a replacement for, not a concomitant of, military production. It is not always advantageous to expand the consumer product line which a military enterprise produces before conversion is effected. In most cases this has to do with low-technology goods that were foisted on them. For example, the recently declassified Caspian Mining and Metallurgical Combine of the Minsredmash [Ministry of Medium Machinery Manufacture], which among other things was previously involved with the mining and beneficiation of uranium, is already producing about 1,500 consumer items—from spare parts for motor vehicles to facing tile.

What are we to produce instead of reactor fuel, the demand for which is abating due to people's resistance to plans for nuclear power plant construction? In a similar

enterprise, for example, plans call for organizing the production of high-purity materials for use in microelectronics and circuits. This particular enterprise was not mentioned by PRAVDA, even though the article published under the rubric "Top Secret" was apparently written to convince the reader that there are no more secrets in this area.

One thing is clear: Conversion effected under conditions of economic accountability must not bring about any decrease in profitability of work nor necessitate a step-down from complex and technologically demanding production operations to rudimentary and uncomplicated activity. This can trigger a drop in value of the product line, which will lead to a reduction in social level of the workers, with this in turn causing gravitation of trained workers to a more complex and highly-paid activity. The end result will be suffering on the part of the consumer, since even if we do have enough metal beds and beer will be offered for sale on every street corner, you can be sure that there will be a shortage of personal computers, an absence of which renders existence as a part of the civilized world unthinkable.

Another conversion problem of no less importance is devising an economical way to dispose of the enormous amounts of combat materiel that is to be eliminated either in the unilateral initiative process or as a part of a bilateral agreement reached with the U.S. Thus, according to an announcement made at the U.N., the Soviet Armed Forces are to undergo a reduction of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. The Soviet side is eliminating several thousand missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty. Hopefully, if the matter proceeds to a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments, further reductions will include tens of thousands of units of highly complex combat equipment that have cost billions for development and production and the intellectual labor of thousands of people.

Realistically speaking, we have just begun to disarm, but, as the saying goes, "We have already committed a number of grave errors in this regard." In the case of disarmament proceeding under the INF Treaty, for example, imaginative thinking has not progressed beyond converting prime movers used with the SS-20 missile into self-propelled platforms to be used as truck-mounted cranes, and utilization of two missiles as water towers by a gardening group operating near Kharkov. According to official announcements, the cost of INF Treaty components not subject to destruction amounts to 150 million rubles, which includes 50 million rubles for heavy prime movers.

The remaining armaments are being blown up on proving grounds, cut apart by welding torches, and crushed in presses. Instead of demonstrations of blowing up expensive missiles on proving grounds and giving away pieces to the peace-loving public as souvenirs, would it not be better to once more invite the Americans to the conference table and try to think of how to utilize

the remaining missiles for peaceful purposes? It would also afford an opportunity to develop suitable monitoring procedures that would prevent military use of the missiles.

Scientists who have designed military equipment have estimated that utilization of the missiles in a large program of geophysical research would save the country 100 to 150 million rubles. The Soviet RMD-22 missile being eliminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement could with certain modifications lift a payload of about 100 kilograms more than 500 kilometers, while the RMD-23 could do the same to an altitude on the order of 300 kilometers. These are the very altitudes that are not regularly researched by civilian geophysical rockets.

The guidance systems of missile stages, if removed before the missiles are destroyed, could be utilized as high-speed power plants to effect another 15 million rubles in savings. If instead of blowing up the missiles we were to destroy them by cutting up the propulsion systems—the procedure followed by the Americans—the national economy would benefit by its receiving back high-strength steel and valuable nonferrous metals in the amount of more than 3 million rubles. By converting launcher prime movers and transport vehicles for the RMD-23 into self-propelled collapsible high-mobility platforms, we could service various tower structures (radio relay towers, power transmission lines, etc), with a minimum of 40 million rubles remaining in the country's pocket. Finally, we could give one or two missiles, reworked so as to be disabled, to all the country's military-patriotic museums, set them up as tourist displays and charge admission for the pleasure of looking at a relic of the military confrontation period. I do know that some foreigners are willing to pay for this in foreign exchange.

Thus, the balance of expenditures for the development and production of RSMD [intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles] and the minimal savings resulting from their elimination are certainly negative. We must not repeat our error under any circumstances, if we are to speak of eliminating 50 percent—not 4 percent—of nuclear weapons per such a Soviet-American agreement. There already is talk of the possibility of utilizing elements of the strategic triad—to monitor the environment, for example.

Thus, large SS-18 missiles could be modified to serve ecological purposes, lifting artificial earth satellites into orbit. These kinds of satellites could be employed to survey the earth from space: monitoring the dynamics of cloud and snow cover; observing thermal inhomogeneities of the earth and ocean surface, volcanic activity, and forest fires; photography as applied to monitoring of crop harvests and plant diseases.

We could also not take the route of destroying heavy bombers offering a range of several thousand kilometers

and a large cargo capacity, instead using them as multiple-function ecological laboratories. Such laboratories could monitor emissions from metallurgical, chemical and other ecologically hazardous enterprises located in remote areas of the country.

Nuclear-powered submarines, which are also included in the agreement limiting SNV [strategic offensive weapons], can do mankind good service if modified for ecological and economic purposes. This would make it possible to compensate in part for the shortage of scientific research vessels provided with ecological laboratories for oceanic research.

Maximum peaceful use must be found for all components of conventional armaments subject to unilateral reduction. Here we are once more feeling our way. It is proposed to destroy half the number of tanks and utilize the remaining half as simulators. No one is even concerned about the elementary economic inefficiency of converting materiel costing many millions into cheap models. Someone in Perm has proposed rendering artillery systems into pile-driving apparatus and modifying tanks to function as powerful and high-mobility bulldozers.

It is obvious that the absence of a general approach to conversion of conventional armaments to civilian applications can cause even greater material losses, since, ironically enough, these kinds of armaments are much more expensive than nuclear armaments. For this reason, I consider that it is important, at this early stage of reduction, to organize a group of qualified experts that would look at various options of elimination and utilization of combat materiel from the economic point of view and would select those options that could be employed at least cost but with maximum consideration of national economic interests. If it so happens that the INF Treaty or the Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaty bind us to international obligations, the question of how to proceed with reduction of conventional weapons as a function of unilateral disarmament is for us to decide. To join this group we could invite experts from other countries, primarily the U.S., Sweden, England, and Norway—countries that possess much more experience than we. If we do not skimp on expenditures now, we will enjoy a substantial gain in the future; if we are greedy, we will suffer a loss.

Conversion of combat materiel by modification for civilian applications will apparently be planned as a loss-associated process. It is difficult to imagine the number of ecological investigations that must be carried out in the case of a former nuclear-powered missile carrier to at least make up for the costs of its construction—amounts that according to Western estimates may be as much as billions of dollars. However, even the thought that a pile of metal of a highly complex piece of equipment that has been a heavy burden to the country will provide some kind of economic return is of and by itself not bad.

Nevertheless, there are ways of converting combat materiel that make it possible to effect considerable economic profitability. One of them is associated with employing some items of military materiel in peaceful tasks. This pertains mainly to military transport aviation. The 60-odd AN-124s, AN-22s, IL-76s, and AN-12s remaining accountable as belonging to the Ministry of Defense will carry this year about 50,000 tons of economic freight costing more than 45 million rubles. Transportation costs will be calculated on the basis of rates usually applied in civil aviation. In this connection, 70 percent of the fees received will be transferred to the state budget, with the remaining amount retained by the Ministry of Defense as reimbursement for additional expenditures associated with these operations, including use of the aircraft.

I believe that this kind of conversion is entirely rational, since an urgent need for military transport aviation can develop in the case of unforeseen circumstances, such as the earthquake in Armenia or the gas pipeline accident in Bashkiria, a time when it became necessary to move large amounts of materials and hundreds of people great distances in a short period of time. For this reason, a dynamic and well-equipped transportation organ should always be in a position to carry out the orders of the State Commission of the Council of Ministers for Extraordinary Situations.

Why cannot civil instead of military aviation be used to make deliveries to residents of the Far East, Far North, the Arctic islands, oil workers, gas pipeline builders, and all persons who work in remote areas? The necessary aircraft could be acquired from the same Ministry of Defense, while operating expenses in the civilian sector would be milder.

Incidentally, the sale of materiel slated for armament reduction is another source of cost recovery that has hardly been touched. The Ministry of Defense has already prepared and forwarded to the USSR Gosnab a list of these items totalling more than half a billion rubles that are under consideration for sale in 1989 to the public, to cooperatives, and to other organizations through the territorial organs of the Gosnab. This list includes instruments, mechanisms, and even auxiliary naval vessels; more than 20,000 refuelling, transport, and pumping units for fuels and lubricants; towed meat processors made for the Army and designed to slaughter cattle, dress and refrigerate the meat under field conditions; microcircuits, transistors, diodes, and other radio and electrical devices used by the military, and much more.

It is obvious that the only items offered for sale are those pieces of military equipment that can be put to civilian use without any modification. Should we consider offering, to state and cooperative organizations, for example, several types of tanks subject to elimination, but at the same price paid by the Armed Forces, minus depreciation? It should be understood that such a sale

will take place under the condition that the steel monsters be subsequently disassembled under strict state control. There is no doubt that enterprises of the machinebuilding, metallurgical, and other ministries would be interested in acquiring the armament either independently or in collaboration with enterprises of other sectors, the idea being to divide the parts among themselves. Parts which are not needed will be scrapped.

The receipts resulting from sale of armaments on the home market will be incorporated into the state budget. Some of the receipts can be used simply to reduce the enormous inflationary amount.

I see nothing reprehensible or detrimental to internal stability in selling armaments and their components to Soviet organizations. First, the items can be rendered unfit for combat use before the sale; second, we are not concerned with our security, since we do sell the latest types of armaments to foreign countries. Last year the Soviet military's MIG-29 was demonstrated for the first time, at Farnborough in England; at the recent show at Le Bourget in France we came out with the SU-27 fighter-interceptor and the SU-25 ground-attack aircraft.

It is common knowledge that the shows are held not only for the prestige value, but also to find someone with whom mutually advantageous commercial contracts can be negotiated. Judging from the press reports, our aircraft were highly regarded by experts, in spite of the accident.

According to Western sources, the Soviet Union is one of the largest suppliers of armaments to the world market. In the late 1970s we went so far as to hold talks with the U.S. relative to reducing international sales and deliveries of armaments, something we have actively continued to pursue. The open press has not reported what kinds and amounts of arms we ship and the particular countries receiving those shipments.

There may be some merit to supplying to foreign countries a portion of the combat material that is being pulled out of service, naturally not to include that which is not to be distributed under the terms of international legal obligations, the IAEA, or other organizations with which our country is involved. It would be wise to direct these deliveries to customers that are in a position to pay for the materiel in hard currency, at the same time analyzing the level of the monetary effectiveness relative to military exports by comparing the volumes of foreign sales of weapons for hard currency with the volumes of deliveries on the basis of Soviet credit terms. Considerations of political expedience would be of decisive importance, naturally.

If it becomes possible for military plants, the same as other Soviet enterprises, to enter the foreign market on their own, this will contribute to developing the competitiveness of the country's machinery exports. Currency earned by the enterprises could be used by them to finance conversion and retooling, with the result that they would rapidly acquire the capability of supplying

the foreign market with a wide assortment of sophisticated civilian products reflecting world standards. The state's role in this regard would consist of regulating and balancing the economic and political interests of military exports and devising economic incentives to encourage military enterprises to manufacture competitive products for the civilian market.

Finally, a major concern in conversion is the human aspect. Reduction of the Armed Forces will result in the discharge of a half a million men. Many of them have families. This means that the reduction will affect the lives of a total of about 1.5 million persons. If we add to this figure the number of those who will be forced to leave military enterprises as a result of closings or realignment, the total number of persons directly affected by conversion will be even larger.

Social protectiveness of man is one of the principal achievements of socialism. However, the problem here is that the state is not always able to fulfill its requirements due to the fact that many socio-economic problems the country is suffering have not been solved in general. If the situation is such that even an officer discharged from the Army after completing his term of service cannot obtain an apartment for three years, let alone the three months stipulated by law, what will happen when a large number of servicemen will be discharged? Even the 7,500 apartments the Ministry of Defense plans to build in the next two years specially for them will not solve the problem.

According to statements made by military officials, the first to be released are officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, and servicemen on extended service who have attained the maximum age and are authorized a pension and have housing waiting for them. Also to be discharged are all officers called up for active duty from the reserve. Some servicemen of these—the most socially secure groups—will return to their previous jobs, while the others will fill the ranks of millions of "young" pensioners. This will place a greater load on the pension component of the military, i.e., the state, budget.

It is difficult to predict the outcome of the solution proposed jointly by the Ministry of Defense and the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Problems of Labor and Wages]. This consists of hiring discharged servicemen to fill specific jobs in the country's enterprises and construction projects in the Far North and equivalent areas and on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Military people are disciplined, but will they want to become "average citizens", walking on permafrost or wading through rural mud? In addition, what about their qualifications? It is quite possible that many of them simply do not offer the specialties required in the North or on the farm.

Our Army is aging quite a bit. This is especially noticeable in Moscow, in the area of Bulvarnoye koltso and Frunzenskaya naberezhnaya. We must adopt measures

that will prohibit the discharge of young officers, military VUZ instructors, military scientists, physicians, and jurists, and provide for the retraining of servicemen whose specialty is no longer in demand.

In a word, the Armed Forces and armaments reduction process is laborious and expensive. Official estimates indicate that the new military-technical policy, which calls for the design of inexpensive asymmetric armaments, review and reduction in purchases of offensive armaments, a general lowering of expenditures in connection with elimination of RSMD, and the reduction in the Armed Forces, will, on the basis of the approved five-year plan, effect savings of almost 30 billion rubles. That is not much.

Furthermore, it is not clear that the above figure includes expenditures—and they are not inconsiderable at that—that are associated with effecting the conversion process. If it does not, this leaves open the possibility that reduction in defense spending will entail other and greater expenditures for other departments to finance retooling of military enterprises for civilian production, the utilization of armaments, and reemployment and retraining demobilized servicemen. Past experience and econometric modeling of conversion carried out in other countries indicate that it requires additional not fewer expenditures as far as the state is concerned, especially in the initial stages.

A situation wherein conversion has the negative effect of exacerbating existing socio-economic imbalances can be prevented by developing a Special-Purpose Integrated Conversion Program. It should offer built-in flexibility and proceed from approved political decisions related to disarmament on the one hand, and future decisions to be made in this regard on the other, up to complete disarmament.

No harm would be done if such a program were in place at the present time. It could be built on the principle of some kind of self-financing and cost recovery for conversion. This kind of economic accountability presupposes the development of priorities for each stage of conversion, such that it would be possible to make up for the attendant expenditures on the basis of the resources released by disarmament, with the added advantage of a surplus of funds that could be used to resolve socio-economic tasks.

Relative to securing support of disarmament on the part of common people, who are much more interested in what they can buy in the store than in questions of international security, it may be a good idea to publish a statement showing the advantages and disadvantages of particular measures pertaining to this process: so much spent to manufacture the armaments being taken out of service; so much to be spent on conversion; so much remaining; the kinds of tasks the available funds can resolve: construction of a large residential facility, road repair, higher pensions, etc.

To prevent further destruction of expensive military equipment and inefficient use of military-industrial potential in our compliance with disarmament agreements, we could operate under the aegis of social organizations, primarily the VTSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and the SKZM [Soviet Committee for Protection of Peace], to devise a competition to gather ideas for alternative uses of armaments. This is the route taken by trade unions of some Western countries, whereby they developed conversion models as early as the beginning of this decade, a time when there was no discussion of disarmament.

In this connection, I cannot fail to mention that legislation on conversion has been debated in the U.S. for the past quarter of a century. Bills are usually introduced for consideration by Congress several weeks after the USSR makes an announcement of reduction in its Armed Forces. That was the case in the early 1960s during the "Khrushchev demobilizations" and in the early part of 1989, even though the U.S. as a whole has not raised the question of reducing its Armed Forces.

If our legislators were to carefully examine this draft bill, they would certainly see that many of its provisions are applicable to Soviet military economics. The most important point to be made here is that conversion in a militarily significant country must necessarily be placed on a legislative basis. It is precisely a legislative setting that is required to solidify the concept, purpose, principles, control mechanisms, finance sources, planning methods, time frames, and other parameters of conversion. The latter involves enormous masses of productive forces; its effectuation without preliminary adoption of a USSR Law and associated state plan may lead to serious socio-economic disruptions.

Everyone is affected by conversion. In this area, which is new to us, we can no longer operate by trial and error, since too much time would be lost on each trial and the cost of each error would be too high. Conversion must not only insure that each step of practical disarmament strengthens the abstract security of man; it must also proffer a lightening of his burdens of life and labor, something which to him is much more meaningful.

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Conversion: Lvov Association Increases Consumer Output

*18011003 Vilnyus SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
13 Aug 89 p 1*

[TASS: "From All Corners of the Country".]

[Excerpt] LVOV. Various household devices, together with military equipment will be produced in a new building which is being put up at the Lvov Association imeni 50th Anniversary of the October [Revolution]. The "defense workers" made peaceful goods before as

well, but their percentage in the total volume of production was insignificant. Now it is planned to increase the output and assortment of consumer goods.

Baku Factory Building Converting to Medical Production

18011005

[Editorial Report] Baku BAKINSKIY ROBOCHIY in Russian of 16 Aug 1989 publishes on page 4 an interview with the Azerbaijani Minister of Health, T. Kasumov conducted by A. Kyazimadze and entitled, "A Pressing Interview: Needles and Syringes!" According to the editorial introduction the Azerbaijani SSR Council of Ministers has concluded a contract with the Swedish firm ADP Trading Limited International for the construction in Baku of two factories to produce disposable needles and syringes. These production lines will be installed in premises formerly housing a defense related enterprise. The operation will occupy an area of 240 square meters. Four individuals will be able to run the operation.

Civilian Production at Khrunichev Plant

18230077 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Sep 89 p 2

[Report on interview with Director of the imeni M.V. Khrunichev Machine Building Plant Anatoliy Ivanovich Kiselev, by G. Lomanov: "Bicycles for Children and Orbiting Modules"; date not given]

[Text] Bicycles for children and orbiting modules are produced by the same plant. This is symbolic. However, is this symbol in line with the tasks of conversion in aerospace production?

"We are now standing on the runway," said Director of the imeni M.V. Khrunichev Machine Building Plant Anatoliy Ivanovich Kiselev.

Actually, we assembled in a small, cozy conference hall. However, a long time ago there indeed used to be an airfield at the present location of the building for the assembly of space vehicles. For many years, it was as if this plant did not exist. There was a "post office box" number, and that was it. This was a secret enterprise. This summer, its secret status was revoked; specialists from China and Japan had already visited here. Finally, they invited Soviet journalists as well. Well, it is better late... At any rate, the desire of the plant director, who has been working at the plant for 34 years, since age 17, to tell us about the history of the enterprise is quite justified.

So, here is some history. In 1918, they repaired here, in Fili, the armored cars and tanks which were sent to the vicinity of Tula to meet the White Guard troops. One of the first five Soviet passenger cars rolled out of the plant gates 2 years later. It was presented to the "all-union elder" M.I. Kalinin. Later, Junkers received in the form

of a concession the enterprise which produced 100 Ju-20 planes. Beginning in 1927, the plant embarked on producing heavy aircraft: Before the war, they made Tupolev's TB-1's and TB-3's; during the war, the PE-2 dive bomber, and the TU-2 and IL-4 bombers. In the 1950's, strategic bombers designed by Myasishchev were produced which are still in service. One of those craft was adapted for carrying the Buran (our newspaper has reported on this operation).

Work on the Proton rocket designed by V.N. Chelomey is yet another milestone in the history of the plant. For almost a quarter of a century, since 1965, the Protons have been putting into orbit heavy satellites and orbiting stations, and have been launching interplanetary vehicles to the Moon, Mars, and Venus. There have been 180 launches; the old workhorse knows his job. This is a reliable machine, and our space exploration owes many brilliant successes to it. All permanent orbiting stations beginning with the first Salyut and through the Mir which is now in orbit have been built at the imeni M.V. Khrunichev Plant. The collective is also proud of the Kosmos-1443 apparatus. At the time when everything was classified whether it was necessary or not it was called "a satellite," although it was actually an excellent space ship, as the cosmonauts who were looking forward to flying it told me with enthusiasm. Alas, it did not work out. This is one more "blank spot" in our space exploration, but this is a separate topic. For now, let me observe that by docking with Salyut 7 Kosmos-1443 demonstrated an opportunity for large masses to dock successfully in orbit. The creation of research modules for the Mir station could hardly have been initiated without this "trial by fire."

Anatoliy Ivanovich says: "Now there is a new turn in the history of the plant. The production of Protons has been cut back approximately one-third. The conversion of aerospace production is beginning."

[Lomanov] What are you going to do?

[Kiselev] Even now we produce a wide range of consumer goods. Many people certainly know the Druzhok bicycles for children; it is just that they did not know before that we were the producer. Meanwhile, this is a plant within a plant; we produce 220,000 of them a year. We make ski poles, pressure cookers, kitchen furniture, garden sheds, sleighs, hoops for gymnastics, what have you. The share of consumer goods and civilian output in the total volume of our production is approximately 25 percent.

[Lomanov] You know, Anatoliy Ivanovich, I do not admire this enumeration. Moreover, it brings up the biting retort by the economist A. Kireyev: "Of course, the enterprises which have created Buran and Energiya are capable of riveting together metal beds in which we can sleep as soon as the coming night. However, when we wake up tomorrow, we will find out that, to our amazement, not only the developed world but also many of the countries which are traditionally called developing have,

as far as technology, gone into the third millennium before the appointed time while we have been left behind in the old squeaky bed."

We are likewise reluctant to engage in primitive production and waste the high technical potential of the plant for trifles, says A. Kiselev. This is why we have now planned two main avenues for ourselves, health care and ecology. A quarter of a century ago, high-quality ozonizers were invented in our country. They do a marvelous job cleaning up organic compounds in waste waters; they are patented in several countries, but thus far nobody has been producing them. We have embarked on this. We will produce the Superterm installation for the treatment of oncological diseases by local heating. Together with the Moscow Association of the Handicapped, we are setting up the PRINKO cooperative. We have already embarked on manufacturing a trial batch of knee joints for artificial limbs. Taking the experience of Chernobyl into account, we will produce robots capable of working in the course of accident clean-up.

[Lomanov] What will you go into while cutting back the productions of the Protons?

[Kiselev] We are planning to manufacture equipment for converting passenger cars to run on [natural] gas on the premises freed up.

We stood together with Chief Engineer of the plant Yu. Gorodnichev in front of a huge vacuum chamber, 5 meters in diameter. Sealing is the forte of the enterprise. Yuriy Petrovich told us how carefully space vehicles are checked out before being shipped to the space complex. Quite recently, one of the modules for the Mir was tested. Incidentally, there were several modules at different stages of completion sitting in the shop—they immediately caught your eye.

Yuriy Petrovich observed: "Three of them are ready, and two have been tested." Naturally, the conversation immediately switched to another topic and another emotional tonality. The plant personnel were even taken

aback by the question on the reasons why the launch of research modules was being delayed then.

"What do you mean it is delayed?" retorted A. Kiselev. "We sent the additional equipment module to the space complex right on schedule, to the day, as long ago as July of last year."

[Lomanov] Why has it been sitting idle so long?

"The plant has got nothing to do with this," Deputy Minister of General Machine Building, Chief of the USSR Glavkosmos [Main Space Administration] A.I. Dunayev came to the rescue. "The enterprise was given the deadline and assigned the task, and the collective handled it excellently. The delay is due to other reasons. First, the contractor enterprises which were making the 'filling' for the modules had very many orders for the Buran program. Preparations for launching the space 'shuttle' caused a major diversion of both scientific and production resources. Second, it turned out after the docking of the new modification of the Progress cargo ship that even a comparatively small change in the configuration of the orbiting complex makes controlling it much more difficult. This is to say nothing about the module; after it is docked, the space combination will resemble a boot. Dynamic operations will be rendered extremely difficult. You see, we have to fully equip the second module and get it docked on the opposite side in order to balance the assembly. After all, the 'boot' may fly for about 3 months and no longer. This means that modules have to be launched almost one after the other. This is why we delayed the first one deliberately."

...Well, research and technical modules manufactured at the imeni M.V. Khrunichev Machine Building Plant will soon reach the Mir. However, space exploration is not the only customer of the enterprise anymore. We would like to believe that, while developing the manufacturing of products which are not associated with space, the collective will go toward its future on something more modern rather than the Druzhok bicycle.

The director is right: We cannot waste the experience which has been accumulated in one of the most progressive industries.

**Suvorov on DOSAAF Economic Operations,
Consumer Goods Output**

*18011012 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
3 Sep 89 p 2*

[Report on interview with Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy Major General Vasily Vasilyevich Suvorov, by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT commentator Yu. Grachev: "Potential For the Development of the Material Base is Far From Exhausted"]

[Text]

[Grachev] Vasily Vasilyevich, the Administration of Capital Construction and Material-Technical Supply of the USSR DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy] Central Committee handles many issues. Would you object if our conversation were to begin with the productive sphere?

[Suvorov] From the beginning of this year, production enterprises and design and technology offices of the DOSAAF switched to complete economic accountability and self-financing. Now we have an opportunity to review the results of the first half-year. Technical and economic indicators have improved, the output of specialized products has increased, and labor productivity is higher. The quality of modern technical instruction aids for schools and clubs of our defense society is higher. For example, we have succeeded in completing the development and beginning the production of simulator-examination consoles. Training organizations need these electronic devices badly.

The number of graduates of programming classes increased by 20 percent. We are trying to meet the demand for prestigious products which include racing cars, go-carts, and buggies. The plan for producing them has been overfulfilled. The output of radio stations increased by 20 percent.

[Grachev] Do the products of DOSAAF enterprises draw complaints?

[Suvorov] Unfortunately, thus far there have been complaints. Some of our products still do not comply with the standards accepted. This is frequently due to the absence of necessary raw materials, companion parts, and products.

There was a serious exchange concerning this at the government level. Chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Nikolay Nikiforovich Kotlovtshev recently spoke at the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. As a people's deputy of the USSR, he stressed the need to eliminate the residual principle in allocating supplies to the defense society.

Our complaints were received with understanding in the government. Support from the USSR Gosstab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] and a

number of ministries and offices were promised, and it has begun to materialize. Nonetheless, the hindering factor is still perceptible. Our enterprises would have a much greater opportunity with regard to both the volume of output manufactured, and the variety of assortment and quality improvement if they had good-quality raw materials and subcontracted materials.

At the same time, a number of athletic technology products compete successfully with their foreign analogs. For example, the International Carting Federation has issued a certificate for the racing car ShKS-87 produced by the "Patriot" Production Association in Leningrad. The prototype has been registered by the International Carting Organization.

The OV (350) class scooter developed as a completely new design with complete aerodynamic stabilization has been manufactured. The racing vessel has no analogs. Its speed performance exceeds world standards.

There have been certain accomplishments in improving the quality and competitiveness of custom-designed products. This has been achieved due to the implementation of modern synthetic materials in designs. We have taken a perceptible step forward in the field of improving motor vehicle simulators. The Kharkov Design and Technology Office of the "Kontur" Production Association is involved in applying microprocessor technology in the motor vehicle simulators of the AT-II series which will allow us to enhance their training potential, quality, and reliability. In the future, we expect to develop computerized motor vehicle simulators using TV equipment in the capacity of modeling devices. With a view to enhancing the quality of radio stations produced, we are working on improving their main characteristics. The development of equipment for package communications which is new in principle, has begun.

[Grachev] Prospects for the development of manufacturing and output of new products are hopeful. Could this be attributed to the fact that production enterprises have been given economic independence and that managing them has been decentralized?

[Suvorov] Yes, certainly. Out of 36 production enterprises, only nine report to the center. We are planning further restructuring of their operations, streamlining of economic accountability, and decentralization of management. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee carries out a unified technical policy with regard to all enterprises, performs the functions of a methodological organ, develops and introduces materials on standards, and streamlines specialization and cooperation among DOSAAF enterprises.

We are sometimes rebuked for decentralizing only small production enterprises while leaving the largest ones under our control. However, this is not so. The largest production associations operate within the framework of the Ukraine DOSAAF Central Committee and Armenia DOSAAF Central Committee. I mean primarily the production association "Dnepr" with an annual volume

of production of 17 million rubles. As I see it, Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] DOSAAF Central Committee Boris Ignatyevich Khar-chuk need not have complained in an interview to SOVETSKIY PATRIOT about us supposedly appropriating a large segment of profits from the Ukrainian enterprises of the defense society.

At the same time, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee expresses its concern with the future status of DOSAAF enterprises in the event of their possible transfer to the republics or local soviets. Such a transfer, if it were to take place, would set back [accomplishing] the tasks of reinforcing the material facilities of the defense society in a serious manner; the loss will be hard to recoup.

[Grachev] Tell us please about the main reasons for delays in capital construction. How many facilities under endless construction do you intend to mothball? What will be the loss due to this?

[Suvorov] Poor work by contractor organizations is the main reason for the arrears in fulfilling capital construction plans. Regardless of the low availability of machinery and labor, they strive to ensure more contracts. This is a well-known gambit. Construction organizations wish to secure spare funds in order to later maneuver them as they see fit. DOSAAF facilities, as a rule, suffer due to such arbitrariness because they are classified as "others," that is, those which do not enjoy a priority status.

Local committees of the society organize construction with their own resources. With the help of local party and soviet organs they find untapped potential, make use of it, and secure favorable results. For example, the DOSAAF Central Committees of Lithuania and Moldavia, and the Bashkir, Mari, Moscow, Sakhalin, and Kaliningrad oblast committees of the defense society have on the whole fulfilled construction assignments. They are situated in different regions. This means that the economic industriousness of committee leaders influences the final result rather than regional peculiarities.

Thus far, we cannot say the same about the DOSAAF Central Committees of the Ukrainian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR, Bryansk and Kuybyshev oblast committees of the society. They used to always be among the best, but now they have fallen behind.

Construction in aviation organization gives us cause for much concern. Leaders of the Kaluga, Atkarsk, Kostroma, Buzuluk, Novosibirsk, and Ryazan aviation clubs are not showing proper concern for developing construction on the basis of their own resources. Leaders of these oblast committees of the DOSAAF are not active either.

As far as the mothballing of facilities under endless construction and the losses associated with it are concerned the question has been put incorrectly. It is not the

mothballing of facilities but exactly drawn-out construction itself that is the main culprit in the losses inflicted. In 1987, we mothballed 12 facilities, but then in 1988 we managed to marshal the necessary resources and means to them, and a large share of them were commissioned.

[Grachev] In the course of the pre-election campaign, you and Deputy Minister of Defense N.V. Chekov who has now been elected a people's deputy from the defense society visited many lagging construction projects of the DOSAAF. Much time has passed since. Have there been any changes?

[Suvorov] We visited construction sites of the athletic complex "Dolphin," of the Zaporozhye imeni A.I. Pokryshkin Flight School of DOSAAF Pilots, and the Barki airfield of the Moscow Aviation Club. I may say unambiguously that at the facilities we have been able to see perceptible progress has been made.

To be sure, in the first half of the year the standard percentage of plan fulfillment was not ensured. However, in comparison with the same period of last year, 10 percent more funds have been utilized. This indicator could be substantially higher yet if military construction personnel in the field were not held back by the lack of materials and machinery, and on occasion by the lack of administrative skills and indifference on the part of committee leaders in the matter of equipment delivery, provision of financing for the construction projects, and performance of other duties of a construction customer.

Taking into account the fact that DOSAAF construction projects are not facilities covered by the state order, the USSR Ministry of Defense accommodated us. Beginning in 1989, the construction sites which we very much need were put on the register of the control and dispatching facility which puts them on the same footing as state-order sites.

[Grachev] What is the status of housing construction for the employees of the defense society?

[Suvorov] In recent years, we have increased capital investment for matching participation in housing construction by a factor of more than 2.5. Taking into account the funds transferred for the development of the communal infrastructure and facilities of the construction industry, the volume of matching participation in housing construction amounts to more than 20 percent of the total capital investment set for the defense society. In addition to this, individual DOSAAF committees and organizations carry out the construction of residential buildings with their own resources and on a contractual basis. The overall volume of housing received and commissioned in 1989 and 1990 will amount to up to 500 apartments a year. If this amount of annual allocation of apartments is kept up in the 13th and 14th 5-year plans, we consider it possible to meet by the year 2000 the need for living space of the employees of the society who do not have their own space or require an improvement in their accommodations.

However, we should not think that this is not much of a problem. At present, 2,553 families have no apartments, and 1,716 families need to improve their accommodations.

These people who are not properly settled frequently encounter indifference to their needs. People have complained about incorrect actions by the chairmen of the Orenburg (R. Dulkan), Tambov (V. Tolokonnikov), and Chechen-Ingush (V. Lunkov) oblast committees of the DOSAAF in which justice is not done.

[Grachev] Concern for improving the conditions of work and life and elimination of the incidence of work-related injuries is one of the avenues of social transformations. What can you say about the status of occupational safety at the enterprises of the defense society?

[Suvorov] In recent years, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has created a branch base of occupational safety standards having spent 693,600 rubles for this purpose last years.

However, the status of occupational safety at the enterprises and in the organizations of the DOSAAF remains unfavorable.

A continuous increase in the incidence of production-related fatalities is the cause for special concern. In 1988, traffic and motor-vehicle accidents accounted for 54.4 percent of the overall number of fatalities, aviation accidents for 27.2 percent, and other causes for 18.3 percent.

The incidence of injuries is the highest in the organizations and at the enterprises of the DOSAAF of the Ukrainian SSR, Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Kabarda-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Maritime Kray, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Volgograd, and Ulyanovsk Oblasts.

The jump in the incidence of work-related injuries and fatalities was facilitated by the atmosphere of secrecy surrounding these facts. It was not the custom to discuss this; everything was shrouded in "secrecy."

The status of working conditions at many enterprises and in the organizations of the society cannot but concern us. In many cases, city and rayon committees, schools, plants, and especially athletic and technical DOSAAF clubs occupy old, dilapidated premises and basements. Some of the managers of organizations and trade union committees do not take measures in order to create healthy and safe working conditions.

[Grachev] Vasily Vasilyevich, would you please tell us about the contribution of DOSAAF enterprises to producing consumer goods?

[Suvorov] On the whole, production of consumer goods accounts for 30 to 35 percent at the manufacturing enterprises of the defense society.

According to the classification, car simulators, sports and racing cars, go-carts, "buggies," sports vessels, sets of ship and plane models for the technical development of children, internal combustion microengines, and so on are considered to be consumer goods. These products in their entirety are also classified as specialized products of the defense society; as a rule, they are earmarked for our own consumption. The goods are distributed directly at the committees and organizations of the DOSAAF and in part are sold to the populace through retail outlets.

Finally, our collectives resolve a large set of issues in providing material and technical support for DOSAAF committees, organizations, and manufacturing enterprises. However, there are so many problems with supplies now that a separate consideration of this topic is desirable. In particular, issues of rational and thrifty use of material resources are going to be considered specifically by the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee in October.

Prospects For Demilitarization of Europe

18011002 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Sep 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Vladlen Kuznetsov: "A Warning For All Times"]

[Text] During the breakthrough phases of world development—and we are currently living through just such a phase—our thoughts turn more frequently to history than they do in average, so to say, ordinary times. They turn to history's experience, its lessons. They seek in history answers to the mind-boggling questions of modernity, support for decisions of principle.

The peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe, recently commemorated the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. The tragic events and the lessons of the half-century's remoteness must not fade into oblivion, to blot out the memory of the generations. They are a warning for all times.

The wounds on the body of Europe have been healed for a long time now. But the scars remained, and they are as irremovable as is the memory of war itself, and its lessons, which should not be forgotten, even if almost a half-century of peace has reigned over its former ruins and ashes, the longest peace in the continent's history. It should not be forgotten because the complications, crises, and conflicts usually arise from the things to which we attach no particular importance at the moment, like a fire from a carelessly thrown match or cigarette butt, or an unextinguished campfire. Where there is military confrontation or contiguity of blocs, it is dangerous; any spark may prove fateful. As even Aristotle said, wars arise over trifles, but their reasons are never trivial.

In many ways, Europe's peaceful future is already ensured, by the recognition of the inviolability of borders and the existing status quo, by the incipient physical disarmament, the common-European process, and the general improvement of East West relations. Many politicians and commentators associate the further fate of these relations with the processes of renewal in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These changes, which require peaceful conditions for their realization, work toward stabilizing the situation in Europe, toward weakening military confrontation. Such is the objective content and intention of these transformations, and they are evaluated as such in those circles of the NATO countries which think realistically. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the venerable political scientist and former national security adviser to the U.S. President, has on more than one occasion in the past given cause for criticism of his biased approach to events in the socialist world. If I am not mistaken, he is now nearing the point of rising above his odious antipathies, declaring that the transformations in Eastern Europe have fundamentally important consequences for the stability of the relaxation of tensions between East and West. In the political scientist's opinion, in light of this, the NATO countries

must "give a clear understanding that the West recognizes the necessity of Poland remaining in the Warsaw Pact."

However, not everyone is approaching such sober calculation. The temptation to play the Poland and Hungary cards is too great for those people for whom the world is "wedged" between the opposition of the "free world" and "godless communism," people who still think in categories of "rolling back" socialism. They are even trying to infect and attract official circles with their inept passion. On the pages of the WASHINGTON POST, R. Evans and R. Novak claim to be rousing the administration out of "deep slumber." In the authors' opinion, it "does not have enough foresighted strategic thinking in order to exploit the crack in the Soviet empire." The dense back-seat drivers also found their way into the NEW YORK TIMES, where they are dissatisfied with the White House's "surprisingly restrained reaction" at a moment when "there appeared a real opportunity for the weakening of communist influence in Europe." These gentlemen emancipate themselves from the need to think about what might occur, and what the end might be if the two sides take it upon themselves to weaken one another, to seek out cracks in the systems of their alliances, and to drive wedges into these cracks. As a result, would not stability, security, and peace in Europe, the basic interests of both sides, suffer?

I do not think that U.S. national interests on the continent would consist of conducting a course for the stratification of the Warsaw Pact structures, setting certain countries off against others, nudging toward "decommunization" and a "break with the USSR." Such an approach will not strengthen the U.S. position in Europe, for there can be no strong support, no reliable system of peace on unhealthy, torn-up soil. U.S. interests would be best served if they did not deviate on the whole from the interests of the majority of European states which crave stability, provision of good neighborly relations, and emancipation from the pressure of military expenditures.

What, in general, do American interests in Europe consist of? Of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? But after all, the members themselves aspire to this as an ultimate goal, if, of course, NATO reciprocates. Of bringing the socialist countries closer to the West, of assimilating its values? But after all, the socialist states are involved in this themselves, renouncing their former reticence and trying to enrich their value system with everything which seems worthy in the different life style.

The majority of peoples is convinced that the very greatest value, the highest interest is the opportunity to work and compete in peaceful conditions, to exchange accomplishments for the common good. However, in Washington, up to the present day, they have seen their interests not so much in international trade, which COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] has fettered in a mass of discriminatory stipulations, but rather in a high degree of political and

military opposition on the continent. Today, a few people even call for an increase in that level.

True, in the White House recently there have been more frequent announcements of aspirations to "agree on a less militarized Europe," as President G. Bush himself put it. His proposals for reducing conventional forces and armaments in Europe appear to be more serious than, and preferable to previous American projects. However, there is still no basis for speaking of a radical revision by Washington of the scale and direction of its "military responsibilities" on the continent.

It is difficult to imagine a "less militarized Europe" without rejecting the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and "flexible response," geared toward "pre-emptive" use of nuclear weapons, without eliminating the European nuclear weapons remaining on the continent. Excluding its small tactical systems from the overall process of European disarmament, as the NATO leaders insist upon doing, would lead to a new take-off for the arms race in the nineties. To this day, the NATO countries still consider it possible to conduct maneuvers "during the course of which they theoretically destroyed a major part of Central Europe with the use of tactical nuclear weapons," as the American television company ABC reported.

A "less militarized Europe" is not compatible with the preservation of the Pentagon's military bases; with Washington's reluctance to discuss the problem of reducing the naval forces which play a noticeable role in the European strategic balance; with the various plans intended to compensate for the elimination of the medium-range nuclear systems covered by the Soviet-American treaty, themselves assessed as a "loss" by the NATO leadership.

Because of the opposition of many of the North Atlantic partners, Washington had to postpone the program for improving the nuclear systems remaining in Europe. However, now and then reports crop up in the western part of the continent that a "quiet" modernization is taking place. This testifies to the fact that Washington is determined to avoid a "third zero" at any cost, fearing both for the fate of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and for the preservation of their obviously prolonged presence on the continent, which is no longer justified by any need. After all, across the ocean they fear that Western European society may demand that a "third zero" be followed by a "fourth," the withdrawal of the American "defenders," since the need for them declines as a result of the disappearance of the scarecrow of the "Soviet military threat."

Influential circles overseas still see American interests in Europe to be in the preservation of their emplacement and outpost in the Old World, as well as in the creation of such Western European military structures and organizations as would be under U.S. influence. These circles try to convince both themselves and others that U.S. interests are not served by active, multifaceted, and equal cooperation within the United States—Western Europe—Eastern

Europe "triangle," but by a policy of differentiation, a "divide and conquer" policy with regard to the Warsaw Pact state, a policy of widely-advertised, but essentially meager "dosed" assistance which they are prepared to administer only to prevent the regular concession.

It seems that it would be much more useful to convince themselves of something entirely different. Of caution, of the need for a balanced approach, or delicacy, if you will. All the more so because the position of the White House does not always seem to be that way. We cannot but be alarmed that Washington today is not tactful in its relations, say, with Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, or several other states. It seems that the White House must still show that it is not acting on a "what you see is better than what you get" basis, nor paving the road to the "common European home" with intrigues; that it is not giving in to the Soviets, nor to the temptation to put an early end to world socialism and the "Soviet empire." A superpower, imperial course is unsuited for Central America, Europe, or any other region. A sincere and honest policy based upon firm convictions and principles cannot be bifurcated. It cannot be duplicitous, with a false bottom, or a rock ready behind the back.

It must be seen and accounted for that the "decommunization" of Eastern Europe would lead to disintegration, and that would lead to destabilization. There is no state in Europe or beyond its borders whose interests would be served by a destabilized continent, one which had to pay for this with war a half-century ago. Those who emphasize the United States-USSR rivalry in Europe are taking a heavy responsibility upon themselves. Only Moscow and Washington's consolidated role, only their partnership is capable of rendering Europe the service it needs most: the organization of a structure of peace which would spare Europe conflict once and for all.

Col Gen Omelichev Statement on Weapons to Nicaragua

*18011021 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 89 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed article entitled: "Once Again On the Facts".]

[Text] In connection the the propaganda campaign developing in the USA concerning the supposed increasing deliveries of arms from the USSR for Nicaragua, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Colonel-General B.A. Omelichev stated to a TASS correspondent:

Such assertions do not conform to reality. After 1988 The Soviet Union made no deliveries of it's [Soviet] weapons to Nicaragua. This was made known officially to the American side already at the beginning of last year. Subsequently it was publicly stated that world society justly valued those actions of the Soviet Union as real contributions to the normalization of [the] Central America[n situation].

Kiev MD Commander on Aid for Afghan Vets

18010905 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Jul 89 p 1

[Interview with B.V. Gromov, USSR People's Deputy, Commander of Troops of the Order of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union, by O. Yermolina: "We Must Understand and Aid the 'Afghan Vets'"]

[Text]

[Yermolina] Boris Vsevolodovich, the soldiers who fought abroad have great respect for you. We have noted this many times when talking with them.

[Gromov] Thank you! It is the same respect they feel toward many of the officers who served in Afghanistan. You see, there the soldiers saw us not just as commanders, but as elder comrades who were always with them, in difficult moments as well as happy ones. In Afghanistan, as never before, I realized what military brotherhood was.

Dear to me are those special, sincere, truly human bonds that were formed there. In the face of mortal danger no one dissembled. Everyone said what he thought. Afghanistan showed each of us what we were made of, good and bad. And in our contradictory life that can be a difficult experience.

I am not prone to idealize the "Afghan vets," to make them out to be something they are not. I believe that we must all try to understand and help them. For that reason I welcome the benefit auction which your newspaper and the association of reserve servicemen are conducting. This is truly charity.

[Yermolina] You ask people to understand the "Afghan vets." Does that mean they are in some way different from others of their generation?

[Gromov] Let us judge together. An 18-year-old lad from a quiet, peaceful life ends up in a place where shells are bursting and his friends are dying. He goes through a reevaluation of everything he has experienced. And when he returns, he is no longer the same person. Perhaps he seems a little reserved to those around him, but inwardly he is fairly uninhibited in his views and convictions.

And here we have the first conflict: There are privileges, but more often than not they remain on paper, unrealized. And let us suppose that the lad returned an invalid... Or awards. In a sense he has them, they've been presented to him, but he never received them. The military commissariat is running behind... Speaking of which, in my military district we compiled and sent off repeat lists for 900 men. So the "Afghan vet" shows excessive impatience and impulsiveness, and they tell him in reply, "No one needed this 'limited war,' and it was a mistake to commit troops." It is a very convenient arrangement for covering up bureaucratic inefficiency.

[Yermolina] And what is your opinion as a commander: Was it necessary to commit troops to Afghanistan?

[Gromov] There has not yet been a political appraisal of the events in Afghanistan. To speak on that theme, you must have a point at issue. I can say one thing: Our help was needed. But what kind of help is another question. I believe that it was not necessary to involve ourselves in military actions.

Furthermore, a clear distinction should be drawn between those who carried out the order and those who made the decision to commit troops. Blame for what happened must not, even indirectly, be laid on the shoulders of the soldiers and officers. They carried out their military duty in a foreign war with honor.

[Yermolina] Boris Vsevolodovich, on the one hand special bonds formed between the servicemen in Afghanistan, and on the other, certain events occurred that were contrary to regulations. How do you reconcile this?

[Gromov] Regular people, with their virtues and their shortcomings, served in Afghanistan. And of course it is naive to suppose that everything went smoothly. There were incidents and non-regulation treatment of soldiers, but they occurred in those subunits that did not participate in operations and combat missions.

In the overwhelming majority of instances, there was a very different sort of "dedovshchina" [hazing of new recruits by those more senior]: It was when the senior enlisted men put a young soldier in their middle, in essence sheltering him, or when only the "seasoned vets" tried to go into battle. That is, the experienced soldiers protected the raw recruits and helped them to get "acclimatized" more quickly. The final withdrawal of our troops is an example of this. Hundreds of soldiers and NCO's who had already been transferred to the reserves, whose mothers, wives, and children waited for them at home, nonetheless stayed on to ensure that we withdrew safely. They risked their own lives, were caught in avalanches, and got frostbite, but they knew very well that without them it would have been still more difficult for us.

[Yermolina] You have become a USSR People's Deputy. What part of your activities is set aside for the problems of the soldiers who fought abroad?

[Gromov] A significant part. First and foremost, I lay special emphasis on the resolution of social issues: job placement for the disabled and providing housing. I devote special attention to those "Afghan vets" who are under treatment in hospitals. I do what I can so that they will not feel themselves shut off from life.

Another concern of mine is the establishment of military-patriotic clubs. The soldiers in the reserves do not have the resources to start them up on their own. Our Kiev district has acted as a patron of sorts to these associations and provided approximately 80 percent of what they needed.

[Yermolina] You probably receive quite a few letters from "Afghan vets."

[Gromov] Yes. Each envelope contains someone's illness or problem. But I have noticed that the requests which the boys send me do not concern themselves personally, but rather the military-patriotic clubs. That is, they do not want an apartment for themselves, but a location for their club; they do not want a car for themselves, but equipment for teenagers... And this pleases me.

[Yermolina] Boris Vsevolodovich, many of the readers know about you in your role as general and commander of troops... But what do you like to do in your free time? What are your interests?

[Gromov] As you know, the commander of troops of a military district has barely enough personal time. But when the opportunity arises I try to go to the theater, and to the ballet in particular. My parents instilled in me a love for it, and I am very grateful to them. I like to listen to popular music, although I do not understand modern "rock." I am comfortable with Iosif Kobzon and Sasha Rozenbaum. I enjoy satire and humor. I like to go to the concerts of Vladimir Vinokur. Among authors, I am most comfortable with Viktor Astafyev. Among the classics, Lev Tolstoy. And of course I try to keep myself in good physical shape. I am a tennis enthusiast.

[Yermolina] Thank you for talking with us! Allow us to wish you health and success in your demanding affairs.

Chronology of Events, Decision-Making to Intervene in Afghanistan

18011009 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian 20 Sep 89 p 14

[Article by Igor Belyayev, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* political observer, and Anatoliy Gromyko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "That Is How We Ended Up in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Today there is a possibility of raising the curtain from the mystery of the adoption of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Passions are still seething around this mystery and, it seems to me, the time has come to speak about it. Of course, within the limits of available information...

Realities

Kabul, 27 April 1978. A military coup took place in the capital of Afghanistan. The country's president, former Prince M. Daud, and his closest aides were executed. Power went into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. People in Moscow were amazed. The Soviet leaders did not expect anything of the kind. People in Washington were frightened. Against the background of the approaching disaster in Iran, the CIA had not been devoting enough attention to Afghanistan and had overlooked the revolution that was brewing...

Kabul, 30 April 1978. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed. Nur Mukhammed Taraki, the head of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], was named head of state for the first time. Speaking on Kabul radio, he announced that a "real revolution" had taken place in the country and affirmed the new regime's faithfulness to all the treaties and commitments with foreign states. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was formed. Its composition was made public on 1 May 1978. Taraki became prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs was Hafizulla Amin. Socialism was proclaimed to be the goal of the revolution in Afghanistan...

Moscow welcomed the creation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and recognized the new government. And it did not want to take note of the specific features of Afghanistan...

Tehran, 10-12 February 1979. An anti-shah revolution was accomplished here. The monarchy in Iran collapsed and the Islamic revolution began. Moscow observed the events in the neighboring country not only with a great deal of interest, but also with a certain amount of apprehension. Panic reigned in Washington. The Americans had been driven out of Iran and with the most destructive consequences. All of their problems were still ahead of them.

Kabul, 14 February 1979, 8:45 am. The always punctual American ambassador in Afghanistan Adolph ("Spike") Dobbs was in his car in the center of the noisy city when four Afghans dressed in the uniform of the local traffic police came up to him. Having jerked open the door, without identifying themselves, waving their pistols, they ordered him to get out of his car and led the ambassador to a car that was parked nearby. In it the kidnapers took A. Dobbs to the Hotel Kabul and barricaded themselves in one of the rooms. From here they began negotiations with the local authorities, demanding the release of Bakhruddin Bakhez [name as published], one of the Shi'ite leaders who was in jail at the time. The negotiations were drawn out and even after 3 hours the kidnapers were threatening to execute the ambassador. Afghan police and soldiers began to storm room 117 where the kidnapers and the ambassador were. A. Dobbs was fatally wounded and died soon after he was delivered to the embassy building. No statements followed from the White House or the U.S. State Department, which is surprising in and of itself.

Was the murder of the American ambassador in Afghanistan intentional? Was something supposed to have followed after the death of A. Dobbs? All this remains a mystery to this day. Julius Mader [name as published], a recognized CIA expert abroad, in an investigation entitled "Operation Hindukush" asserts that he was especially sent to Kabul after the April 1978 revolution in order to prepare for a coup there...

March 1979. A counterrevolutionary uprising broke out in the province of Herat, which is populated mainly by

Afghan Shi'ites. This was the first alarm signal for Kabul, an open challenge to the revolutionary authority...

The situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate for almost a whole year. The reforms that had been started proceeded with interruptions, and the resistance to them assumed the most unexpected forms. The Kabul Government turned to the Soviet Union for help. Dispatches flew to Moscow with appeals to send troops. At first two battalions were requested...

The uneasiness in Washington increased because of the loss of Iran. Feverish searches were started to replace this country in U.S. world strategy. In the foreign political strategy it was decided to shift from India to Pakistan and to use Afghanistan as a "back door" to return to Iran and a staging area for the Soviet Union. Of course, nothing was heard about this...

Vienna, 15 June 1979. U.S. President J. Carter came here to sign the Soviet-American treaty for strategic arms limitation (SALT II). The treaty could have contributed to a general detente. The heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on this. But J. Carter intended to privately notify L.I. Brezhnev of something important...

Vienna, 17 July 1979. During a business meeting at the Soviet Embassy the U.S. President felt it necessary to announce:

"I would like," he said, addressing Brezhnev, "for detente in Europe to extend to other regions where the United States and the Soviet Union have different approaches... We have vitally important interests in some of these regions of the world. And the Soviet Union should recognize these interests. One of these regions is the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Your country must restrain itself in order not to violate the interests of our national security... There are many problems in Iran and Afghanistan, but the United States is not intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. We expect the Soviet Union to do the same..."

Brezhnev answered:

"We have also heard on the radio about the revolution in Afghanistan. And we have stimulated change in the government of this country (which was the absolute truth—I.B.). The Soviet Union hopes that the United States will join it to halt the attack on the current regime in Kabul..."

The U.S. President and the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, after the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, each went home with his own opinion. J. Carter was clearly overwrought and allowed himself to be straightforward. Brezhnev did not see anything unusual in the words of the U.S. President.

The beginning of September 1979. Afghan President Nur M. Taraki participated in the conference of nonaligned countries in Havana. On the way home he visited Moscow. He was received as the head of a friendly state.

Again Taraki was reminded of the Kabul Government's request that the Soviet Union send its soldiers to protect the Afghan revolution. . .

By September 1979 Hafizulla Amin was playing an important role in Afghanistan. He became the head of the government and the minister of defense and practically controlled all of the country's domestic and foreign policy. His rapid rise disturbed Taraki very much. While he was in Moscow the head of the Afghan state noted that Amin was not conducting the policy on which they had agreed at the very beginning of the revolution, and this could lead to dangerous consequences. He was given to understand that changes were possible... How great was Taraki's surprise when stepping out of the airplane in Kabul he saw in the group of Afghans there...Amin. As eye witnesses tell it, he was staggering from the emotions that overwhelmed him. But the reality was such that the enemies had to embrace and then ride in the same car to the meeting of the plenum of the PDPA Central Committee. There he also discussed the results of his visit to Moscow. And the members of the plenum all went home to continue their work. And then suddenly...

Let us give some excerpts from the recollections of Army General Ivan Grigoryevich Pavlovskiy who was in Kabul at the time. He was in charge of a group of our military advisers there and chanced to be a witness to the tragic events.

"Friday, 14 September 1979, Kabul. Well, it was an eventful night! A bloody massacre! When I arrived at the home of Ambassador A. Puzanov I found out that after the morning meeting between Taraki and Amin at which they had their disagreement, Amin demanded that Taraki get rid of four ministers (their names follow)... and stated that he would retire if there were a new defense minister. And Taraki wanted this intention to be realized. Having reported what had occurred in Moscow, we...received instructions to visit Taraki and Amin, and that they should be together so we could try to reconcile them and patch up the split in the party. It was especially emphasized that Taraki should be protected from Amin's attack?!"

I.G. Pavlovskiy further recalls that Taraki and Amin were reconciled. But only in words...

Another remark from the army general:

"Tuesday, 9 October 1979, Kabul. Today Hafizulla Amin showed his teeth, his combative nature, his aggressiveness and despotism. On instructions from the center, the Soviet ambassador and I and several others (their names follow—I.B.) visited H. Amin and delivered to him a statement from our leaders regarding some imprecise information given by the Afghan Ministry of Internal Affairs to the ambassadors from certain socialist countries concerning our visit to the residence of Nur M. Taraki on 14 September 1979...at the time of an attempt on the life of H. Amin organized by Taraki... Today H. Amin told us nothing about the fact that Taraki is no longer alive. And when we returned to the embassy there was an announcement on Kabul radio that Taraki had

"died" and had been buried in his family burial vault. His, Taraki's, wife had also "died"... Now that is reprisal!"

Another overthrow?

Brezhnev took what had happened personally. To those closest to him he said that he had been given a slap in the face, to which he had to respond. And his response was...

The Decision

Igor Belyayev: What did A.A. Gromyko say about the reasons for sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan?

Anatoliy Gromyko: This is a difficult question for me. Previously, before my father died, of course, I would never have tried to answer for him. For many reasons. During our numerous walks in Zarechye where his dacha was, as a rule we discussed many other things, but rarely Afghanistan. In none of my works, for example, about the Kennedy brothers in the book "New Thinking in the Nuclear Age" or my latest work, the dialog "Will our Countrymen Survive?" did I refer to statements from my father. I considered that unethical.

Igor Belyayev: To a certain extent you are right and wrong at the same time. For now you are obviously one of the few who can discuss the last statements of A.A. Gromyko concerning Afghanistan. The more so since the "Afghan decision" is not simply one of many decisions. Very many people are thinking, speaking, and debating about it now. As concerns statements of a personal nature made recently, they can remain in the shadows...

Anatoliy Gromyko: I shall discuss only what I know for certain, without any interpretation on my part.

Igor Belyayev: Agreed. Try to give the most precise possible picture of what was said and heard.

Anatoliy Gromyko: Remaining forever in my memory are the words about Afghanistan my father spoke during the days of the session of the First Congress of People's Deputies when this subject developed into a heated discussion. In common use at that time were words such as "the crime of the century" and "occupation." And here for the first time during our walks through the forest my father started to talk about the circumstances when the Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan. I listened to him carefully and remembered. The historian's instinct had something to do with this:

"The decision concerning military assistance from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan was made 10 years ago under the influence of both objective—and they were the main ones—and subjective circumstances. The objective ones were the following: the desire of the U.S. Government to destabilize the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet border and to create a threat to our security. After the loss of the shah of Iran and the removal from there of weapons aimed at the USSR the intentions to replace Iran with Pakistan and, if possible, with Afghanistan, became a reality. As concerns Pakistan that is what

happened. It became a military and political ally of the United States and tried to overthrow the legal government of Afghanistan. The second important circumstance that influenced our decision was the murder in Kabul of Taraki, the leader of the April revolution, by conspirators headed by Amin. This was also regarded by the Politburo as an attempt at a counterrevolutionary coup in this country which could be used by the United States and Pakistan for their purposes against the USSR.

"We knew their strategic and foreign political positions at the time and the plans being put forth in the U.S. Government for destabilizing progressive regimes that were friendly to us. These plans remain in the arsenal of Western diplomatic policy to this day. It was naive not to see them. Moreover, actions for carrying them out have now even been stepped up.

In 1979 neither in the Politburo nor in the CPSU Central Committee nor in the leadership of the union republics was there a single person who would have objected to satisfying the Afghan request to render military assistance to friendly Afghanistan. In any case I was not aware of any opinions like this. Now people sometimes say that these decision were made behind closed doors by several high leaders of the country. Yes, that was indeed the case. They were members of the Politburo. But then these decisions of the Politburo were unanimously approved by the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Today, 10 years later, one may not agree with the decision but there is no justification for casting doubt on the political basis for our aid to Afghanistan. My suggestion to submit this decision for the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet was not accepted by Brezhnev..."

Igor Belyayev: I shall interrupt Anatoliy Andreyevich's discussion of A.A. Gromyko's statements in order to emphasize that his suggestion to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet was very significant. For if such a session had been convened and at an open or closed meeting they had discussed the decision to send Soviet soldiers into Afghanistan on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan 1921 Friendship Treaty in order to create a safer situation on our southern borders, then the country's highest legislative organ would have said "yes" or "no."

Anatoliy Gromyko: In the discussion I recall that my father touched upon the situation in the country at the time. "Of course," he said, "today, from the standpoint of glasnost and perestroika, which I completely support, it is easy to criticize the previous mechanism for decisionmaking about Afghanistan. But at that time, in 1979, in reality there was a different, more influential mechanism for making decisions than the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of the time. And, incidentally, there is no state mechanism for making such decisions to this day, and one will have to be created.

"As for the question of who was invited to the first conferences on Afghanistan and who was not, this depended on the wishes of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

"Today Brezhnev, Andropov, Kosygin, Ustinov, and Suslov are no longer alive. Only a few, including myself, remain of those who discussed this problem behind the doors of the general secretary's office, which actually were closed. And I shall not deny that after that discussion we arrived at a unanimous opinion that it was necessary to temporarily send a limited number of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. It is impossible to give the nuances of this discussion now since there are no living witnesses to these conversations except for myself. I consider it wrong to be the only interpreter of them.

"I should just like to observe," he noted, "that Brezhnev was simply shaken by the murder of Taraki, who not long before had been his guest and who thought the Amin grouping might enter into a conspiracy with the United States."

My father added: "At that time our troops were given strict instructions to be billeted in Kabul and certain other cities. And in the case of extreme necessity were they to use weapons. In essence in Afghanistan we were rendering international aid. We rendered it after April 1985 as well. I think," he said, "that all the troops who fought in Afghanistan are heroes, especially those who gave their lives in this bitter battle for the interests of our security. I consider all the wounded men to be international heroes as well. They should be given all kinds of assistance and support just as the veterans of the Great Patriotic War are."

Igor Belyayev: And so the fateful decision on Afghanistan was made. When? According to the words of A.A. Gromyko, apparently in November or the beginning of December of 1979.

At the meetings of the Politburo were there any objective opinions of experts "for" or "against" the adoption of the decision to send in the troops?

Did any of the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee hear any expert opinions regarding to question of the expediency of sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan? A.A. Gromyko noted that he was not aware of any expert opinions.

Questions for Army General I.G. Pavlovskiy:

"Ivan Grigoryevich, did you express to any of the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee your opinion on the question of sending Soviet soldiers into Afghanistan?"

"I reported to a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, that there was no need to send our troops into Afghanistan. And I presented a number of considerations in support of this opinion."

"Did you not have other proposals regarding the situation that had been created, particularly in Kabul?"

In spite of his 80 years, the intelligent, still hearty general glanced at me searchingly, his sharp eyes belying his age, and answered:

"I did. In particular I suggested having one of the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee receive Amin in Moscow after he had alarmed so many people. But..."

Neither the first nor the second suggestion of the member of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR deputy minister of defense, the commander in chief of the infantry of the USSR Armed Forces was heeded. Upon his return from Afghanistan Army General I.G. Pavlovskiy was forced to resign his high positions and go to serve in a group of inspectors under the USSR Ministry of Defense. That is the way it was!

In 1978-1979 Afghanistan required increased attention and Moscow did not give it. Before the April coup the USSR Embassy in Kabul was headed by A. Puzanov, a nonprofessional diplomat who had never been in the East before. He was replaced by party worker F. Tabeyev a very short time before the troops were sent to Afghanistan. This practice of appointing ambassadors has never caused anything but confusion. When will we ever be guided by the fact that their work requires special skills? Perhaps then we shall not have such frequent repetitions of episodes in which our leaders learn about the most important events in one country or another...from the radio...

Was the historical experience from other countries taken into account in Afghanistan? No, it was not. It is known that Great Britain during the years when its empire was in existence lost three wars in Afghanistan and British politicians and generals gathered neither military nor political laurels there. True, we had no intention of waging war with Afghanistan...

Another difficult question arises: Why did we begin to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan precisely on 27 December 1979? The selection of precisely this day was no accident. On 28 December 1979, i.e. the next day, Afghan-Pakistani negotiations were scheduled in Kabul. They were to have been attended by the minister of foreign affairs of Pakistan, a country that had become a support point for the United States in Western Asia. I was told about this in Beirut where I was working at the time.

Do you think realities were taken into account when the decision about Afghanistan was made?

Anatoliy Gromyko: Yes and no; that is, they were only partially taken into account. For example, attention was paid to the geopolitical factor and the interests of the security of our southern borders. And although sometimes today in retrospect people try to deny it, this does not cause it to cease to exist or play a part...

Camp David, the suburban residence of the presidents of the United States, 27 December 1979. J. Carter, who was there at the time, having heard the announcement about the dispatch of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, thought that "something very serious" had taken place. His first reaction was that the SALT II Treaty was no more and American-Soviet relations were down the drain. Toward the end of the day he wrote in his diary: "The Soviet Union began to concentrate units on the Afghan border as far back as May 1979 and during the past 24 hours 215 military transport aircraft have landed at Kabul airport and brought in 8,000-10,000 soldiers and advisers."

J. Carter returned to Washington. The White House was almost in a state of shock. The "hot line" between Moscow and Washington was put into operation. An exchange of messages with Brezhnev began. Former Secretary of State C. Vance noted in his memoirs "A Difficult Choice" that Moscow had decided to send its troops to Afghanistan to protect Soviet political interests which had been endangered in this country.

Igor Belyayev: On 4 February 1982 I met with Canadian Ambassador in the USSR Pearson at his request. He said in the conversation that he had the impression the Americans were very much afraid of the Soviet infantry power and the ability of the Soviet Union to deploy it rapidly to Afghanistan! In the Pentagon the generals, along with J. Carter, came to the conclusion that Moscow was trying to take over the Persian Gulf region and even the coast of the Indian Ocean. I remarked to the ambassador that the Soviet Union had no intention of doing that. Mr Pearson noted with a smile that he knew we did not intend to do that, but the American generals thought differently...

18 June 1980. American General D. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the United States was capable of preventing Soviet intervention in Iran in order to seize...Iranian oil.

As we can see, the U.S. reaction to our sending troops to Afghanistan was one of panic. This means the decision that was capable of awakening world public opinion requires explanations in the press and through diplomatic channels, which would help avoid unnecessary aggravations, including in Soviet-American relations.

Did A.A. Gromyko think that in the future the Soviet Union would have to send its troops abroad to protect its interests?

Anatoliy Gromyko: He did not rule out that possibility. When and how are these decisions made when the interests of the security of the homeland force us to them? He thought that the answer to this difficult question should be given by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Then there would be no in camera decision regarding questions of either domestic or foreign policy.

Results and Realism in Politics

Igor Belyayev: The results of sending Soviet soldiers into Afghanistan are known. They are negative. Above all for the Soviet Union. Today when people speak about the more than 9 years our soldiers spent in Afghanistan, I automatically start hearing in my ears the waltz "On the Hills of Manchuria"... And, of course, this could have been avoided if the people who were supposed to do so had considered all the possible results before sending Soviet soldiers south of our border.

Of course everything that occurred in Afghanistan pertains directly to realism in politics as well. It should do more than keep our state figures and the Soviet leadership in check. Realism in politics should pervade all of their activity. Our legislators must also adhere to it.

Anatoliy Gromyko: People frequently call the result of our participation in the war in Afghanistan a defeat. This is a simplification. The struggle there is continuing.

The train of history, however, unlike an ordinary train, will not return to the station where we live, it will not pass by the windows again and again. Historical events are unrepeatable phenomena. And it is possible to understand them, not to mention evaluate them not on the battlegrounds, not at meetings, and not at tribunals, but only through in-depth historical analysis in which not a single piece of reality can be ignored.

Igor Belyayev: A fundamental evaluation of our sending our troops into Afghanistan has already been given. It has been recognized as a mistake. Thus in 1979 the policy of the Soviet leadership did not contain enough realism.

Anatoliy Gromyko: Realism in politics is incompatible with arbitrariness and leader worship. In international relations the time of the politician-magicians and wizard-diplomats has passed. The world has become too complicated and the problems of its development have been aggravated to such an extent that it is no longer possible for any state or party leader to make decisions alone. It is impossible to make an objective analysis of the realities existing in the world alone or in a small group. The experience in Afghanistan tells us precisely this. This means we must turn to collective reason. Not only of politicians and diplomats but also of parliamentarians, scholars, and the Soviet and world public.

Igor Belyayev: And journalists...

Anatoliy Gromyko: Foreign policy always has been, is, and will be a continuation of domestic policy. Perestroika has shown this convincingly. But it does not have enough glasnost, but not in the sense of self-flagellation at which we are so proficient, but in order to reveal the people's will and develop a strategy and tactics of actions both within the country and outside it. The time has come not simply for discussions and debates, but for nationwide referendums. In particular regarding the

question of how we are to live from now on—in a federation or a confederation?

Igor Belyayev: And if the result is the opposite of what is expected? What then?

Anatoliy Gromyko: Following the will of the people, developing and implementing decisions which, while taking minority opinion into account, will not make it possible to impose it on the majority. Otherwise nothing will come of perestroyka.

Igor Belyayev: In conclusion I wish to return to the meeting between Taraki and Brezhnev in Moscow in September 1979. One important detail of their conversation sheds light on what happened later. I just found out about it and I think it will help us ultimately to understand the true cause of the Afghan tragedy...

Brezhnev was speaking with the president of Afghanistan in the Kremlin. The host demonstrated his cordiality and his understanding of what was happening in the neighboring country. In response to Taraki's reminder of his request to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Brezhnev, after a brief pause, said:

"The Soviet Union will not send troops into Afghanistan. The appearance of our soldiers in your country, Comrade President, would probably turn some of the Afghan people against the revolution..."

For a strained moment Taraki thought about what he had just heard and decided that he should not insist on the request he had made...

But what happened to Brezhnev only 5-6 weeks after his last meeting with Taraki? Why did he change his sober conviction that to send Soviet soldiers into Afghanistan would be fatal? Was the sharp change in Brezhnev's attitude not a result of his illness? Although he was undoubtedly the one who played the decisive role in the adoption of the "Afghan decision."

Seriously ill, the head of state made a state decision under strong emotional stress. Yes, after Taraki's murder. Of course those closest to him should have kept the general secretary from making this fatal decision. But the leader worship, multiplied by all the vices in the management of our state that had existed during the years of stagnation, did its work.

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